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I. INTRODUCTION
An increased involvement by local government in a wide range of
social services and economic activities' has generated a flurry of anti-
trust challenges to municipal regulation and licensing. Operations
such as airports,2 trash collection,3 sewer services,4 sports facilities,5
1. State and local government expenditures for all goods and services rose from $2.1
billion in 1902 to $30.6 billion in 1960 and to $71.3 billion in 1980. This represents
an increase in annual per capita expenditures by state and local governments
from $27 per person in 1902 to $315 in 1980. Zimmerman, Reducing the Growth
and Size of the Public Sector: Is New Federalism Part of the Answer?, 7 STUDIES
IN TAXATION, PUBLIC FINANCE, AND RELATED SUBJECTS-A COMPENDIUM 163, 165
(1983).
A considerable part of this increased role of state and local government has
been due to an infusion of federal assistance that increased an average of 15 per-
cent each year from 1958 to 1978. In 1978, the federal government provided a
total of $78 billion to states and cities-17 percent of the federal government's
total expenditures. Sbragia, The 1970's: A Decade of Change in Local Govern-
ment Finance, in THE MUNICIPAL MONEY CHASE-THE POLITICS OF LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT FINANCE 10 (A. Sbragia ed. 1983).
2. See, e.g., Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.
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transit systems, 6 cable television,7 electrical utilities,8 and zoning9
have all been challenged under antitrust laws.
To the extent that a municipality's conduct, albeit anticompetitive,
can be characterized as "state action"10 it may be immune from liabil-
ity under the Sherman Act.1 1 The rationale underlying this immunity
is that federal antitrust laws do not prohibit the imposition of anticom-
petitive restraints by a state acting as sovereign.1 2 This same notion of
federalism applies to cities that are cloaked with state authority.' 3 Yet
in any given case it is often unclear whether a city will succeed on its
claim of antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine.34 More-
over, state action immunity may be stripped away by the application of
various exceptions that expose cities and their officials to antitrustliability.15
The regulatory and legislative role of cities is inherently policy-ori-
ented and frequently requires anticompetitive conduct in order to
Ga. 1982); Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543
(M.D.N.C. 1979).
3. See, e.g., Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982).
4. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), affd,
105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.
Ohio 1983).
6. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F. Supp. 169 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), affd, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1984); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
7. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982);
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984).
8. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
9. See, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Ma-
son City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
10. See infra Section II.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1982). The two principal provisions of the Sherman Act make
unlawful "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations," id. at § 1, and the actions of "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations .... " Id. at § 2.
12. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). See infra notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
13. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
15. For purposes of this Article, a number of categories have been developed to de-
scribe the various reasons used by courts to deny Parker immunity for particular
anticompetitive governmental activities. The general exception to Parker immu-
nity is for conduct that lies outside of the state authorization. More specific ratio-
nales for denying Parker immunity include the "improper self-interest"
exception, the "least restrictive means" exception, and the "co-conspirator" ex-
ception. See infra notes 92-118 and accompanying text.
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achieve lawful municipal objectives. For example, in the regulation of
hospital facilities,16 the creation of an ambulance service system,17 or
similar functions,' 8 the municipality, when acting under "state action"
authority, may lawfully authorize or compel anticompetitive conduct
without antitrust liability.
This Article will review the historical development of the state ac-
tion doctrine and will analyze the current standard for determining
whether a municipality can claim state action immunity from liability
under the Sherman Act. An important issue regarding municipal lia-
bility under the antitrust laws has been whether the treble damages
provision of the Clayton Act' 9 applies to cities. Legislation recently
enacted by Congress,20 which became effective October 24, 1984,
grants cities immunity from any monetary liability, including awards
of attorney's fees or actual damages.
The Article will also analyze the related concept of immunity for
persons who petition for, or otherwise attempt to influence the gov-
ernment to engage in anticompetitive conduct. This petitioning im-
munity is generally referred to as the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine,
21
and is predicated on both the desirability of public participation in the
policy-making process and on the corresponding first amendment
right to petition government, even at the risk of damage to
16. E.g., Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated and remanded, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
17. E.g., Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956
(W.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
18. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee ....
20. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, - Stat. - (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (Supp. I 1984)) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Act]. Section 3(a) of
the Act provides: "No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may
be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, or
15c) from any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an offi-
cial capacity." 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (Supp. 111984). Antitrust injunctive and attorney
fee remedies pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act are unaffected by the new act.
21. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (successful joint
efforts by union and large coal companies to influence the Secretary of Labor to
establish minimum wages at higher levels harmful to small coal companies were
exempt-affirming Noerr determination that anticompetitive purpose or intent
does not bring such conduct within the purview of antitrust laws); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (conspir-
acy among railroads to cause passage of state anti-trucking legislation and to ob-
tain a gubernatorial veto of a bill favorable to the trucking industry was exempt




Like state action immunity, Noerr-Pennington immunity is not ab-
solute but is subject to exceptions which, if applicable, result in expo-
sure to antitrust liabiity.23 These exceptions have been the source of
considerable confusion and inconsistency among lower courts attempt-
ing to apply the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This Article will identify
the problems lower courts have experienced in determining whether
the antitrust laws should apply to attempts by private parties to in-
duce anticompetitive conduct by local governments.
The major focus of this Article is on the functional relationship
between the state action doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Of particular importance is whether the absence of state action immu-
nity for a municipality's anticompetitive conduct will automatically
foreclose Noerr-Pennington immunity for the petitioning party. In
other words, to what extent is Noerr-Pennington immunity linked to
or conditioned upon the availability of state action immunity for the
local government?
This Article will explore the divergent views among the lower
courts on this issue and will attempt to isolate the fundamental policy
forces that support the preservation and proper application of each
doctrine. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 may create
new pressures to restrict the availability of Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity for those who successfully petition for anticompetitive govern-
ment conduct. This Article will recommend an approach to the state
action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines that recognizes necessary ex-
ceptions, but encourages the broad immunity necessary for effective
and efficient local government.
Section II traces the development of the state action doctrine. Sec-
tion III summarizes the much shorter history of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Section IV discusses the relationship between the two doc-
trines and the conflicting results in lower courts for successful peti-
tioners where the municipality's conduct is judged not to be immune
from the antitrust laws. The final sections of Section IV consider the
impact of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 on the availa-
bility of private party petitioning immunity and recommend an ap-
proach to the proper application of both immunity doctrines.
22. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
23. For purposes of this Article, the exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity have
been grouped into four categories of conduct: 1) illegal petitioning conduct
("abuse of process" exception); 2) participation by a public official in the petition-
ing conspiracy ("co-conspirator" exception); 3) government conduct that is pro-
prietary/non-political in nature ("commercial" exception); and 4) petitioning
solely for the harm caused to competition ("sham" exception).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND RESTRICTION OF STATE
ACTION IMMUNITY FOR CITIES: THE PARKER
DOCTRINE
A. Parker v. Brown: In the Beginning
Parker v. Brown,24 was the first United States Supreme Court case
to enunciate state action immunity from the federal antitrust laws.25
In Parker, the Court held that California's anticompetitive agricul-
tural marketing program was immune from scrutiny under the Sher-
man Act. The state law at issue was not pre-empted by federal
antitrust laws. The Court relied on federalism grounds to justify im-
munity for the program, emphasizing that it had been adopted by the
state legislature and enforced by the state acting as sovereign.26
Under the Court's interpretation, the purpose of the Sherman Act was
to control private anticompetitve conduct, not government regulatory
conduct. 27 The Court reasoned that:
[Nlothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history... suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature .... The Sherman Act makes no mention of the
state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or
official action directed by a state.2 8
The notion of state action immunity, as stated in Parker, gave rise
to a general assumption that all local governmental entities, including
24. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the California legislature had enacted a state rai-
sin marketing program that was designed to limit production and maintain prices
in order to avoid ruinous competition in the California raisin industry. The state
permitted a committee of private growers to stabilize raisin prices by manipulat-
ing the market. Id. at 346.
25. The first suggestion of a state action defense to antitrust liability appeared in
Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), just fourteen years after the Sherman Act was
adopted. In Olsen, the Court held that a Texas law authorizing a monopoly for
steamboat pilotage did not violate federal antitrust law. The Court's language
suggested the need for a distinction between private conduct in violation of the
Sherman Act and otherwise similar state regulatory action. Id. at 344-45. The
Court observed: "[It must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal
sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are
alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law." Id. at 345. The
Court concluded that denying immunity to the monopoly granted by the state
would undercut the authority of the state to regulate pilotage services. Id-
26. The Parker Court observed: "In a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitu-
tionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
27. Id. at 350-52. However, the Court emphasized that a state could not immunize
private parties from the Sherman Act merely by declaring their conduct lawful.
Id. at 351. Thus, the Parker Court would have found a state-authorized private
combination in restraint of trade to be subject to the Sherman Act, unless directly
connected to a legitimate state regulatory objective.
28. Id. at 350-51.
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state agencies and local political subdivisions of a state, were exempt
from federal antitrust laws. However, subsequent cases have re-
stricted the state action doctrine. The Supreme Court has indicated
that municipalities are not equivalent to states for purposes of state
action, 29 and that even a state's involvement with anticompetitive con-
duct will not trigger Parker immunity in all cases.30
B. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: A Compulsion Standard
Thirty-two years after Parker, the Supreme Court handed down its
next decision on state action immunity. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,31 the Court rejected a claim that the bar association's minimum
fee schedules were immune from antitrust scrutiny. The Court em-
phasized that, in order to qualify for state action immunity, the an-
ticompetitive conduct must be required or compelled by direction of
the state acting as sovereign. The Goldfarb Court concluded that state
supreme court had merely tolerated but had not mandated the chal-
lenged fee schedules in establishing ethical standards.3 2 Thus, after
Goldfarb, not every act of a state agency would automatically qualify
for Parker immunity.
C. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.: Compulsion Plus Affirmative/Active
State Policy
One year after Goldfarb, the Court issued a plurality opinion in
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.33 The Court held that there was no state
action immunity conferred upon the defendant electric utility when
the state agency passively accepted the utility's tariff that authorized
the anticompetitive practice. The Court concluded that the tariff ref-
erences did not constitute an articulated state policy against competi-
tion, but amounted to mere state toleration of the tariff proposal.
34
29. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
30. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
31. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Goldfarb involved a county bar association's minimum fee
schedule that was enforced by the state bar association, a quasi-state agency. The
Virginia legislature had empowered its supreme court to regulate the practice of
law. Id. at 789. However, that court did not monitor fee schedules. Such fee
schedules were supervised by the practicing bar. Id. at 790-91.
32. Id. at 790-93. The Court stated: "It is not enough that ... anti-competitive activ-
ity is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anti-competitive activities must be com-
pelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." Id. at 791.
33. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Detroit Edison's practice of distributing "free" light bulbs to
residential consumers and recovering the cost of such program through higher
rates was challenged as an unlawful tying arrangement. Detroit Edison argued
that its actions were "compelled" under the utility's accepted tariffs and that the
state action doctrine shielded it from liability under antitrust laws.
34. Id. at 594 & n.31. The facts of Cantor revealed that no state statute regulated the
light bulb business, no statute or agency rule required the light bulb exchange
program, and neither the legislature nor the state regulatory agency had ever
[Vol. 65:330
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The Cantor Court's position was that Parker state action immunity
would not be available where the state's policy regarding the chal-
lenged activity was neutral.
D. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: Clear Articulation, Affirmative
Expression, Active Supervision
The next major decision involving the Parker doctrine concerned a
challenge to restrictions on attorney advertising imposed by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,35 the Court
held that the antitrust laws were not applicable. Unlike the situation
in Goldfarb, the Arizona Supreme Court was "the ultimate body
wielding the State's power over the practice of law ... and, thus, the
restraint [was] 'compelled by direction of the State acting as sover-
eign.' "36 The Court found that the restraints in Bates were clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed by the sovereign as state pol-
icy, and were actively supervised by the state.3 7
E. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Erosion of the
Parker Doctrine for Cities
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the applicability
of the Parker state action immunity to municipalities in City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.38 The Court concluded that cities
are "persons" subject to liability under the antitrust laws and are not
automatically exempt by virtue of their status as agents or instrumen-
talities of the state. The plurality in Lafayette reasoned that under
this nation's dual federal-state system of sovereignty, municipalities
are not sovereigns and that broad antitrust immunity for cities would
threaten the national economic system of competition.3 9
evaluated the desirability of the challenged program or its effect on competition.
The Court found that the state was insufficiently involved in the light bulb pro-
gram and lacked essential interest in the program as part of the state's overall
regulatory scheme. Therefore, state action immunity was not available. Id.
35. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
36. Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
37. Id. at 362. These two elements were subsequently articulated as two separate
standards for antitrust immunity under Parker. California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). For a discussion of the Midcal
decision, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
38. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Two electric utility companies owned and operated by the
city brought an antitrust action against a competing private competitor who, in
turn, asserted counterclaims alleging antitrust violations by the city.
39. The plurality in Lafayette specifically stated:
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal
deference of the States that create them. Parker's limitation of the ex-
emption to "official action directed by a state," is consistent with the fact
that the State's subdivisions generally have not been treated as
equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the serious economic
1986]
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The Lafayette opinion recognized that the state as sovereign could
authorize anticompetitive conduct by a city and thereby immunize the
city from antitrust liability. Under the plurality's standard, state ac-
tion immunity would apply to a city's anticompetitive conduct only if
it was "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service." 40 This standard recognized that states
frequently may prefer to delegate responsibility to cities to implement
state policies. A "state policy" relied upon by a city seeking Parker
immunity would have to be "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed."41 However, the city's specific conduct need not be the sub-
ject of express, detailed state authorization. According to the plurality
in Lafayette, the state legislature need only implicitly authorize the
anticompetitive conduct by "'contemplat[ing] the kind of action com-
plained of.' "42 Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, sought
to limit the Parker exemption to cities engaged in "traditional govern-
mental functions"43 as opposed to proprietary activities.
F. New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. and California Retail
Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.: The
Parker Standard Refined and Adopted
The Lafayette test for state action immunity was adopted by a ma-
jority of the Court later that same year in New Motor Vehicle Board v.
Orrin W. Fox Co. 44 The Court in Fox found that immunity under
Parker was appropriate for two reasons. First, the anticompetitive
state program was clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed in a
regulatory scheme to displace unfettered business decisionmaking re-
garding the location of automobile dealerships. Second, the state
board actively supervised the program by making independent deci-
sions based on objective criteria contained in the statute.
45
dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own paro-
chial interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the anti-
trust laws, we are especially unwilling to presume that Congress
intended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from their reach.
Id. at 412-13 (footnote and citations omitted).
40. Id. at 413.
41. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 389,
434 (1976)).
43. Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Thus, although a majority of the Court
agreed in the judgment, the Chief Justice focused on the nature of the challenged
activity rather than the identity of the parties to the suit.
44. 439 U.S. 96 (1978). Fox involved a program established by state statute under
which existing automobile dealers in a geographic area could protest if the manu-
facturer sought to open a new dealership in that area. The statute required state
board approval of a new dealership if an existing dealer raised an objection.
45. Id. at 109-10 & n.14. The "active state supervision" criterion was described in City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978), as underly-
ing the Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). This
[Vol. 65:330
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Two years later, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,46 the Court refined and further narrowed the
Parker standard developed in Bates and Fox. After Midcal, the chal-
lenged restraint/conduct itself, not just the state anticompetitive pol-
icy, must be "'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.' "47
G. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: More Erosion of
Parker Immunity for Cities
The Supreme Court delivered its next opinion on state action im-
munity in 1982. In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der,48 the Court held that an ordinance enacted under a city's home
rule power does not satisfy the "clear articulation and affirmative ex-
pression" requirement. The court stated:
[Plainly the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is
not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality respecting the
municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A State that allows munici-
palities to do as they please can hardly be said to have "contemplated" the
specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought ....
The relationship of the State of Colorado to Boulder's moratorium ordinance
is one of precise neutrality.4 9
The Court also rejected an argument that the city's ordinance was "an
'act of government' performed by the City acting as the state in local
criterion was explicitly adopted as one of two standards for determining state
action immunity in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In 1985 the Supreme Court held that the "active supervi-
sion" prong of the state action immunity test is not applicable to anticompetitive
conduct engaged in by cities. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
46. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Midcal involved a California resale price maintenance system
for wine. The program in Midcal was denied state action immunity because it
failed to satisfy the "active state supervision" criterion. In Midcal the state alco-
holic beverage control board merely enforced privately made price decisions. The
state failed to establish prices, review the reasonableness of privately set prices,
or monitor market conditions. Id. at 105-06. The first criterion (clear authoriza-
tion) was satisfied because the state legislature's anticompetitive policy was clear
in its purpose to permit the challenged restraint. Id. at 105.
47. Id. (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)).
48. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). In Boulder, a cable television operator sued the city, alleging
that a three month moratorium on the expansion of his business (during which
time the city planned to invite new businesses to enter the cable market) was a
violation of the antitrust laws. The city argued that the requirement of "clear
articulation and affirmative expression" was satisfied by the Colorado Home Rule
Amendment's "guarantee of local autonomy," through which the state had "com-
templated" the anticompetitive regulatory program enacted by the City of Boul-
der. Id. at 54-55. The Court rejected this argument: "Acceptance of such a
proposition-that the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily im-
plies state authorization to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances-would
wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression'
that our precedents require." Id. at 56.
49. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
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matters which meets the 'state action' criterion of Parker."50 The
Court reiterated a position first taken in Lafayette, that the "dual sys-
tem of government"51 results in a principle of federalism "which has
no place for sovereign cities."52
H. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire and Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States: 1985 Cases Clarify
Parker Immunity
After Boulder, it was clear that actions and policies undertaken by
cities on their own without state authorization would not be protected
under Parker state action immunity, even when the cities had been
conferred broad home rule authority by the state. Boulder did, how-
ever, leave several state action immunity issues unresolved regarding
anticompetitive municipal activities.
First, the Supreme Court did not decide in Boulder whether the
second element of the Midcal two-prong test for state action immu-
nity, "active state supervision,"53 must be shown for a city to be pro-
tected under the state action doctrine.54 In Boulder, the Court
suggested that the "active state supervision" standard might not apply
to municipal conduct.55 Justice Rehnquist suggested that application
of the "active state supervision" prong would distort the state/munici-
pal relationship regarding enforcement of municipal ordinances.56 At
least one commentator surmised that Boulder signaled the Court's in-
50. Id. at 53 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)) (emphasis in original).
52. Id.
53. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. -Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) ("The policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."). In Midcal,
the state action exemption was claimed by a private party.
54. After Midcal, many commentators argued that the active state supervision test
applied only to private anticompetitive conduct and not municipal activities. See,
e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 435, 445 n.50 (1981); Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist
System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 341.
55. The Boulder Court observed: "Because we conclude in the present case that
Boulder's moratorium ordinance does not satisfy the 'clear articulation and af-
firmative expression' criterion, we do not reach the question whether that ordi-
nance must or could satisfy the 'active state supervision' test focused upon in
Midcal." Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 n.14
(1982) (emphasis added).
56. Justice Rehnquist expressed concern about the restricted ability of municipalities
to regulate their local economies "without the imprimatur of a clearly expressed
state policy to displace competition." Id. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Re-
garding the second prong of the Midcal test, Justice Rehnquist observed: "The
Court understandably avoids determining whether local ordinances must satisfy
the 'active state supervision' prong of the Midcal test. It would seem rather odd
to require municipal ordinances to be enforced by the State rather than the city
itself." Id. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tention to require active state supervision as a condition of exempting
municipal conduct from the antitrust laws.57 But several circuits ad-
dressing this issue since Boulder have consistently agreed with Justice
Rehnquist, holding that the active state supervision requirement does
not apply to municipalities.5S This area of uncertainty was resolved by
the Supreme Court in a case heard during its last term.59
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau C7aire, the plaintiff towns chal-
lenged the city's ability to use its monopoly position in sewage treat-
ment to force the towns to submit to annexation. 60 The Court refused
to apply the second prong of the Midcal test ("active state supervi-
sion") to municipal conduct, holding that such supervision "is not a
prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the actor is a
municipality rather than a private party."6 '
The Court in Town of Hallie reiterated the need for a municipality
to satisy the first prong of the Midcal test, conduct pursuant to clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. The Court at-
57. McMahon, Recent Significant Developments in "State Action" and Noerr-Pen-
nington Exemptions: From Boulder to the "Sham" Exception, 14 U. TOL. L. REV.
531, 544 (1983) ("Boulder would seem to portend, then, that the Supreme Court
will require 'active supervision' by the state before anticompetitive municipal
conduct may qualify for immunity.").
58. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.
1984) (active state supervision is not necessary where the challenged activity is
within a traditional function of a municipality); Gold Cross Ambulance & Trans-
fer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Because municipal
officials generally are politically accountable to the citizens they represent for the
decisions regarding the challenged restraint, state supervision is not as necessary
to prevent abuse as in the private context."); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
700 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir. 1983) (imposing the active state supervision require-
ment on municipalities "would erode the concept of local autonomy and home
rule authority").
59. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), affg, 700 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1983). Four unincorporated townships filed suit against the City of Eau
Claire, alleging that the City had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by monopoliz-
ing the provision of sewage treatment and by tying such services to the provision
of sewage collection and transportation services. Id at 1715. The City had re-
fused to supply sewage treatment services to the townships. The City did provide
such services to individual landowners in areas where a majority of the property
owners had voted to approve annexation by the City and to use the City's sewage
collection and transportation services. Id. at 1715-16.
The district court dismissed the townships' complaint, finding that the City's
conduct fell within the scope of Parker state action immunity. Id. at 1716. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed.
60. Id. at 1717.
61. Id. at 1721. The Court reasoned that the active state supervision requirement
"serves essentially an evidentiary function" to ensure that the challenged con-
duct conforms to the state policy. Id. at 1720. The Court noted: "Where a private
party is engaging in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is
acting to further his own interests .... Where the actor is a municipality, there
is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement." Id.
at 1720-21 (emphasis in original).
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tempted to define "how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a
municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive activity
constitutes state action."62 The Court concluded that state statutory
provisions need not expressly mention anticompetitive conduct, so
long as the challenged conduct is "a foreseeable result" of the "broad
authority to regulate" conferred by the state.63 The Court expressly
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the state statutory policy must
"catalog all of the anticipated effects" of the authorized conduct.6 4
Finally, the Court in Town of Hallie refused to require a munici-
pality to show that the state "compelled" the anticompetitive conduct
to satisfy the "clear articulation" requirement of state action immu-
nity.65 The Court noted that while explicit compulsion language "may
be the best evidence of state policy, it is by no means a prerequisite to
a finding that a municipality acted pursuant to clearly articulated state
policy." 66
On the same day as the decision in Town of Hallie, the Court de-
cided another Parker immunity case. In Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,67 the Court held that private
common carrier rate bureaus, engaged in collective ratemaking au-
thorized but not compelled by state law, are entitled to state action
immunity.68 Common carriers in the four affected states are permit-
62. Id. at 1717.
63. The Court distinguished the Home Rule Amendment reviewed in Boulder. See
supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. The Colorado Amendment lacked spe-
cific reference to cable television. Here the Wisconsin statutes specifically au-
thorized municipalities to provide sewer services and authorized the conduct with
foreseeable anticompetitive effects. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 105 S. Ct.
1713, 1719 (1985).
64. The Court cited Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette for the conclusion
that requiring such explicit authorization would produce "detrimental side ef-
fects upon municipalities' local autonomy and authority to govern themselves."
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1719 (1985) (citing City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 434-35 (1978)).
65. Compulsion language in Cantor and Goldfarb was found to be inapplicable be-
cause those cases involved private parties claiming state action immunity. Id. at
1719-20.
66. Id. at 1720.
67. 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
68. The United States sued Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference and North
Carolina Motor Carriers Association, charging violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The charges were based on alleged conspiracies with their members to fix
intrastate transportation rates for general commodities. The rate bureaus sub-
mitted, on behalf of their members, joint rate proposals to the respective Public
Service Commissions, (PSC's) in North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Missis-
sippi. The PSC in each state is authorized to exercise ultimate control over all
intrastate common carrier rates.
The district court rejected the rate bureau's claim of state action immunity
and entered summary judgment in favor of the government. United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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ted by state law to agree on rate proposals prior to joint submission to
the state Public Service Commission (PSC) for approval. 69 However,
collective ratemaking is not compelled by the state statutes. Individ-
ual members of the bureau are not bound by a jointly proposed rate
submission; any individual common carrier member is allowed to sub-
mit a separate rate proposal.70
The Court in Southern Motor Carriers held expressly that Parker
state action immunity is available to private parties in circumstances
that satisfy the two-part Midcal test.71 The Court rejected the Fifth
Circuit's holding that compulsion is a threshold requirement for find-
ing that the private conduct is attributable to a clearly articulated
state policy. 72 The Court admitted that "Goldfarb did employ lan-
guage of compulsion," 73 but concluded that the presence of compul-
sion was not a dispositive issue in that case.74 The Southern Motor
Carriers gloss on the Parker/Midcal test is that "regulated private par-
ties" may be immunized by state policies that "permit, but do not com-
pel, anticompetitive conduct." 75  Once the state has "clearly
articulate[d] its intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first prong of
the Midcal test is satisfied."76
This loose application of state action immunity, albeit apparently
limited to regulated private parties, is particularly interesting on the
facts in Southern Motor Carriers. Three of the states involved (Geor-
gia, North Carolina, and Tennessee) have statutes that expressly au-
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the rate bureaus were not entitled to
immunity because the challenged conduct was not compelled by the state. The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that compulsion was a prerequisite for finding that the
state policy is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).
69. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1724 (1985).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1727. In Midcal, the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" and
the "active state supervision" prongs were applied to a situation involving state
regulation of private parties. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In
Southern Motor Carriers, Parker immunity was sought to shield private conduct
from federal antitrust laws.
72. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1727-29 (1985).
73. Id. at 1729. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) ("The
threshold inquiry... is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign.")
74. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1729 (1985). The Court concluded its clarification of Goldfarb by observing-
"Although we recognize that the language in Goldfarb is not without ambiguity,
we do not read that opinion as making compulsion a prerequisite to a finding of
state action immunity." Id.




thorize the collective ratemaking.77 However, the Mississippi statutes
do not expressly authorize such ratemaking. Mississippi law merely
delegates to the state PSC the authority to regulate common carriers.
The Court found that the Mississippi PSC in turn "exercised its discre-
tion by actively encouraging collective ratemaking among common
carriers."78 Despite the lack of any clear legislative pronouncement,
the Court concluded that such circumstances constituted a clear intent
to establish an anticompetitive regulatory program and that "failure to
describe the implementation of its policy in detail will not subject the
program to the restraints of the federal antitrust laws."79 Thus, it ap-
pears that mere existence of a state regulatory program, where an
agency has authority to approve particular anticompetitive conduct,
might support a claim of Parker immunity for the regulated private
parties, even without a clear legislative policy authorizing such con-
duct. This broad application of Parker immunity is likely to be the
subject of future litigation as regulated private parties test the scope of
immunity announced in Southern Motor Carriers.8 0
I. Application of Parker State Action Immunity in the Lower Courts
1. The Search for State Authorization
There is a wide divergence among courts in determining whether a
state statute is sufficient to confer antitrust immunity upon a munici-
pality engaged in anticompetitive conduct. On the one hand, courts
have readily accepted the Lafayette and Boulder language that a city
need not point to a "specific, detailed legislative authorization."s1 In
certain cases, these courts have concluded that fairly general state au-
thorization may be sufficient to confer Parker immunity.8 2 On the
77. Id. at 1730.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1731.
80. Justices Stevens and White dissented in Southern Motor Carriers, contending
that state action immunity is not available for private persons unless their an-
ticompetitive conduct is compelled by the state. Id. at 1732 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens observed that "[w]hen ...state regulatory policies are
permissive rather than mandatory, there is no necessary conflict between the an-
titrust laws and the regulatory systems; the regulated entity may comply with the
edicts of each sovereign." Id. at 1737 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978). See
also Community Communication Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982):
"[lit is not necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each
act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the
challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent. Thus, a trial
judge may ascertain, from the authority given a governmental entity to
act in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of
action complained of."
Id. at 49 n.12 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
82. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir.
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other hand, courts have sometimes taken a much more restrictive
view of Parker and have refused to find state action immunity for a
city's actions despite the existence of an authorizing state statute.8 3
Generally, courts reject immunity in such cases by finding that the
specific municipal conduct was not within the contemplation of the
legislative grant of authority.
Two cases illustrate the extent of court discretion involved in de-
termining whether general state authorizing legislation provides a suf-
ficient basis for invoking state action immunity. In Central Iowa
Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste
Agency,8 4 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a state statute contem-
plated restrictions on competition in the disposal of solid waste and
that the local agency's conduct was protected under the state action
doctrine. The court reasoned:
Admittedly, one must engage in some speculation to determine whether the
State of Iowa genuinely intended to displace competition in the disposal of
solid waste. We agree with the district court, however, that notwithstanding
the statutes' silence on the specific matter of monopolization, it is possible to
infer the existence of an affirmative state policy permitting anticompetitive
practices in the operation of municipal land fills.
8 5
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Parks v. Watson,8 6 refused to in-
terpret a similar state statute broadly to immunize a city's anticompe-
1984) (city's failure to renew a taxicab license is immunized where state statute
provided that taxicabs would not be subject to state regulation of fares and other
conditions of operation if regulated by a municipality); Gold Cross Ambulance &
Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (city regulation of
ambulance service is immune from antitrust challenge where court interpreted
state statute to contemplate that cities might impose restrictions on ambulance
services in addition to those imposed by the state); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) ("If the state authorizes certain conduct,
we can infer that it condones the anticompetitive effect that is a reasonable or
foreseeable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity."); Pueblo Aircraft
Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) (municipality was enti-
tled to antitrust immunity under Parker where the state statute anthorized the
operation of a municipal airport for the benefit of the general public); Cedar-
Riverside Assocs. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290,1298 (D. Minn. 1978) ("statu-
tory scheme as a whole" implied sufficient authorization for city's anticompeti-
tive activities), affd sub nom. Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. City of Minneapolis, 606
F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979).
83. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530 (5th
Cir. 1978) (Florida statutes authorizing state board to take disciplinary actions
against physicians did not authorize the board to engage in improper practices),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557
F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977) (no immunity under Parker where local park district im-
properly attempted to coerce its concessionaires into raising prices and paying a
percentage fee on sales), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated, 583 F.2d
378 (7th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
84. 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
86. 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
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titive conduct. The Parks court viewed the statute's silence regarding
particular restraints as grounds for denying state action immunity.
According to the Ninth Circuit:
The City argues that it is apparent from an analysis of [the Oregon statute], in
which the state authorizes public ownership of geothermal resources, that the
Oregon Legislature "envisioned each separate [geothermal heating] district as
constituting a 'little monopoly.'" From our reading of the statute, it is ques-
tionable whether the legislature intended to create such monopolistic control
by the City. Nowhere in the statute is there any express authorization to ex-
clude private competition in the geothermal market.
8 7
These cases demonstrate the difficulty of predicting whether state
authorization will be inferred to immunize anticompetitive municipal
conduct. Perhaps Professor Areeda has best described this determina-
tion process as one focused primarily on the reasonableness of the
challenged conduct under the circumstances.8 8 Areeda concludes that
the courts will demand a more explicit legislative expression of au-
thority where the challenged conduct is impracticable, inefficient, in-
convenient, and unnecessary.8 9 Because a strict standard would
unduly interfere with many local government activities, Areeda pro-
poses that "the best approach is to infer authority generously for 'ordi-
nary,' 'conventional,' and 'reasonable' activity."90 As if to apologize for
the uncertainty of such guidance, Areeda notes: "This is a perfectly
familiar approach to statutory interpretation: assume that the legisla-
ture intends the 'reasonable,' but require more specific language or
legislative history to justify the 'exceptional.' "91
2. Grounds for Defeating Parker Immunity Claims
In addition to the previously described general basis for rejecting
Parker immunity-where the city's conduct is judged to exceed state
authorization (perhaps labeled under the general heading of "ultra
vires")-it is possible to define at least four other specific categories of
grounds used by courts to defeat claims of state action immunity.
a. Improper Self-Interest
In certain cases, courts have denied Parker immunity where the
challenged conduct would result in an unintended and unfair advan-
tage to the municipality or its officers. Perhaps the best example is
87. Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
88. Areeda, supra note 54, at 447. Professor Areeda notes that Parker immunity may
be inferred despite the lack of express statutory authority where the challenged
conduct is economically motivated and/or consistent with a regulatory scheme.
Id. at 446-47. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
89. Areeda, supra note 54, at 447. See, e.g., Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
90. Areeda, supra note 54, at 448.
91. Id. at 447.
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Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake,92 in which the court held: "The Col-
orado legislature did not foresee, contemplate or intend that zoning
officials would use their legislative authorization to promote their own
interests and economic benefit. Therefore, the defendants have failed
to establish their claim to Parker immunity."93
b. Least Restrictive Means
Another group of cases stands for the proposition that courts will
reject Parker immunity, despite the existence of statutory authoriza-
tion, where the authorized objective could have been achieved by
means less restrictive than the challenged anticompetitive conduct.9 4
Cases such as these fit into a "least restrictive means" category for
denying Parker immunity.
c. Commercial/Proprietary Conduct
Although no cases appear to have expressly denied Parker immu-
nity on such a basis, at least two courts have suggested that a munici-
pality may not be entitled to Parker state action immunity when it is
engaging in commercial or proprietary conduct rather than function-
ing in a regulatory or policy role.9 5 Such a distinction can be traced to
the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Lafayette,96 but con-
92. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980) (Colorado zoning statutes au-
thorized municipalities to zone and constituted a policy to displace competition
with regulation, but plaintiff alleged that zoning officials acted with aim to obtain
plaintiff's property and enhance positions of town board trustees as holders of
property).
93. Id. at 76,330. See also LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,860 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (alleged effect of challenged regulation was to use
governmental powers to gain a competitive advantage for the city itself in the
market of municipal services); Vickery Manor Serv. Corp. v. Village of
Mundelein, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,790 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (alleged systematic
attempts by municipalities to use monopoly power to exact onerous and poten-
tially ruinous conditions from a land developer who sought to purchase a utility
were not immune from antitrust liability under Parker).
94. See, e.g., Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (no immunity for city that
allegedly denied plaintiff parking lot operator access to leased space by sub-
verting normal commercial bidding in a way that was not "necessary to the suc-
cessful operation of the legislative scheme"); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of
Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (exercise of city zoning powers
immune only to the extent necessary to effectuate state zoning policy), affd, 671
F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
95. Shrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1236, 1242 (W.D. Va. 1979), affd per curiam, 626
F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1980); Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. United States, 459 F. Supp.
1290, 1298-99 (D. Minn. 1978), affd on other grounds sub non. Cedar-Riverside
Assocs. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979).
96. The Chief Justice stated: "There is nothing in Parker v. Brown... or its prog-
eny, which suggests that a proprietary enterprise with the inherent capacity for
economically disruptive anticompetitive effects should be exempt from the Sher-
man Act merely because it is organized under state law as a municipality." City
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sidering the Supreme Court's subsequent opinions in Fox,97 Midcal,9 8
and Boulder,99 such a distinction is irrelevant in determining the
existence of state action immunity.100
d. Conspiracy with Private Parties
The most important and perhaps the most frequently applied basis
for denying state action immunity arises when a conspiracy is alleged
between a local government and private parties. This "exception" to
state action immunity arguably stems from language in Parker in
which the Court noted there was "no question of the state or its mu-
nicipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combina-
tion by others for restraint of trade."10 1 Where the evidence supports
a finding of an improper "conspiracy" with private parties, the local
government entity will lose its state action immunity.
Lower courts have had difficulty determining what constitutes an
illegal "conspiracy" that will strip away state action immunity. Where
the local government decisionmaking is truly unilateral in nature, not
made in concert with any other entity, a city should be able to avoid
liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 02 For example, in Grey-
hound Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola,o3 the court refused to
find a conspiracy where the city had no prior contact or discussion
with any of the bidders regarding the use of a particular specification.
Similarly, in Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City,10 4
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions rejected the
Chief Justice's governmental/proprietary distinction. The difficulty of defining
proprietary conduct was illustrated by cne commentator who has classified at
least ten different definitions proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his Lafayette
concurrence. Melton, The State Action Antitrust Defense for Local Government:
A State Authorization Approach, 12 URB. LAw. 315, 327 n.34 (1980).
97. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
98. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
99. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
100. In all three cases cited above, the challenged conduct was regulatory in nature
rather than proprietary. Since immunity was found not to exist in Midcal and
Boulder, it is clear that the regulatory nature of the conduct is not solely determi-
native of the existence of state action immunity. In fact, the determination of
state action immunity turns on the extent of state authorization, regardless of
whether the challenged conduct is subjectively characterized as commercial or
governmental. For a criticism of the "proprietary-governmental" perspective in
state action analysis, see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 432-34 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
102. Generally, in order to violate § I of the Sherman Act there must be joint action in
the form of a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
103. 676 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982).
104. 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
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the plaintiffs claimed that their rezoning application was denied as a
result of a conspiracy between the city and two private developers
hired to carry out the downtown redevelopment plan. Although the
Eighth Circuit in Mason City did not expressly base its decision on the
Parker immunity doctrine, the court did uphold the use of testimony
from city council members who testified that they were not motivated
by the agreement. The court affirmed the jury verdict for the city
based on the admitted testimony, in effect finding that the agreement/
conspiracy did not exist as a cause of plaintiff's injury.10 5 This result
was identical to finding Parker immunity in the absence of a conspir-
acy between the city and the developers.
However, when sufficient evidence is presented regarding an un-
lawful conspiracy between a city and private parties, the courts have
been quite willing to deny state action immunity to the city.106 In
Whitworth v. Perkins,O7 for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's summary judgment for the municipal defendants and
concluded that allegations of illegal conspiracy in the enactment of a
zoning ordinance barred any automatic Parker immunity.108 Whit-
worth is important for establishing a separate method of analysis
based on the "participant" dictum in Parker.1 0 9 In Whitworth, the
court relied on an allegation that the public enactment was intended
to further private financial objectives rather than the public good.11o
The court concluded that such allegations preclude an automatic ap-
plication of state action immunity. Under the Whitworth approach,
the focus is on finding a "bona fide governmental decision" on which
to base Parker immunity.'
105. Id. at 1149. In effect, Mason City suggests that a city will be allowed to claim a
defense of "proper public purpose" as a secondary strategy when a claim of state
action immunity has been rejected.
106. "Conspiracy" connotes an evil or forbidden combination that is absent when local
officials agree among themselves regarding their chosen course of conduct or
when one or more of the officials adopts the position of a petitioner. See P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 203.3 (Supp. 1982).
107. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of Impact v.
Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated and case remanded per
curiam sub nom. Whitworth v. Perkins, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
440 U.S. 911 (1979).
108. The court stated: "The mere presence of the zoning ordinance does not necessar-
ily insulate the defendants from antitrust liability where, as here, the plaintiff
asserts that the enactment of the ordinance was itself a part of the alleged con-
spiracy to restrain trade." Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 1977).
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
110. Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1977).
111. Arguably this standard could be met easily in most cases, since the court need
only determine that the city has at least one justification for its conduct that is
not purely private in character. See Melton, supra note 96, at 368 n.183 & 369
n.185 ("agreements with private entities should not automatically lead to rejec-
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Similarly, in Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau,112 the
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for municipal defendants. The court concluded that "a conspir-
acy to thwart normal zoning procedures and to directly injure the
plaintiffs by illegally depriving them of their property is not in fur-
therance of any clearly articulated state policy."
3-
These cases illustrate the threat to a city posed by conclusory
pleadings of an illegal conspiracy. This problem is aggravated by the
failure to define "conspiracy" clearly.114 Professor Areeda has sug-
gested that "vague and unsupported conspiracy allegations" should be
given very little consideration by the court for three reasons: (1) the
temptation of a private party to claim an illegal conspiracy whenever
the city's decision is disappointing; (2) the slight probability that bad
faith or corruption by the city could be proved; and (3) the potential
chilling effect of antitrust actions on the operations of local
government. 1
5
However, a court may properly reject a city's claim of absolute
Parker immunity where the allegation contains reasonably specific ev-
idence substantiating an illegal conspiracy, such as an official's deci-
sion made solely out of personal bias in favor of a particular private
party,116 or an official's action to benefit only personal financial inter-
ests of the participants."i7
In summary, Parker immunity may be lost due to the city's partici-
pation in an illegal conspiracy. However, a plaintiff who fails to claim
tion of antitrust immunity as long as the local government has a governmental
interest in reaching the agreement").
112. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982).
113. Id. at 746.
114. Permitting a plaintiff to avoid an early dismissal merely by raising a facial claim
of "illegal conspiracy" would allow plaintiffs with meritless cases to hold cities
hostage to antitrust claims for extended time periods. Cities may be forced to
capitulate to such meritless claims and settle the claims before trial to avoid de-
fense litigation costs and the uncertainties of a jury trial.
115. Areeda, supra note 54, at 452. A related issue discussed by Areeda is the review
by an antitrust court of "ordinary" errors or abuses in the administration of pow-
ers conferred upon the city by the state. Areeda argues that such errors should
not support an antitrust challenge because state tribunals can control any admin-
istrative abuses by the city. Id. at 453. Areeda states: "The key factor in Parker
and for all the Lafayette Justices was the existence of a state policy that inten-
tionally displaces antitrust law. Erroneous application of that policy by local offi-
cials does not negate the underlying state authorization." Id. at 450 (emphasis in
original). See Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,050 (8th
Cir. 1984) (failure to follow procedures was not of sufficient magnitude to necessi-
tate abrogating the city's antitrust immunity).
116. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977); Guthrie v. Genesee
County, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
117. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D.
Colo. 1980).
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that the city's decision lacked any bona fide governmental purpose
should expect an early dismissal of the complaint based on the city's
Parker immunity. As summarized by the attorney who represented
the twenty-three amici states on the brief and in oral argument in
Boulder:
The courts simply are not likely to find the requisite joint action other than in
instances when there are "under-the-table" deals between a local government
and another entity to disadvantage a third-party. It is only when anticompeti-
tive actions are undertaken as the result of a true conspiracy involving a city
and one or more other entities to disadvantage a competitor that the antitrust
laws will be, and preferably should be, found to apply.
1 1 8
III. IMMUNITY FOR PRIVATE ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS: THE NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
Whereas the Parker "state action" doctrine protects municipal ac-
tions authorized by the state legislature, the Noerr-Pennington "polit-
ical action" doctrine protects private efforts to influence government
officials in creating or implementing legislation that has anticompeti-
tive effects.119 Both doctrines insulate anticompetitve actors from lia-
bility under the antitrust laws. Municipalities are protected under
Parker and petitioning private parties are protected under Noerr-Pen-
nington. However, the policy roots of each doctrine are distinct, as are
the contexts in which the two doctrines are applied. A proper under-
standing of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its use by the courts
must rest on a careful interpretation of the historical development of
that doctrine.
A. Development of the Political Action immunity Doctrine
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,o2 0 was the first Supreme Court case to establish that attempts to
influence the government were exempt from the Sherman Act, even
when the result sought had anticompetitive effects.12 1 In Noerr, mem-
118. McMahon, supra note 57, at 549-50. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,050 (8th Cir. 1984) (city immunized under Parker where
no allegations of bribery or other illegal acts and where (unlike Westborough
Mall) legislative authorization existed for the challenged conduct).
119. See Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action:
The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 82-
88 (1977).
120. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
121. The Noerr Court used the Parker state action exemption as its "starting point,"
stating-
It has been recognized . .. that the Sherman Act forbids only those
trade restraints and monopolizations that are created, or attempted, by
the acts of "individuals or combinations of individuals or corporations."
Accordingly, it has been held that where a restraint upon trade or mo-
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bers of a railroad conference were charged by truck operators with
conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize long distance freight busi-
ness in Pennsylvania. The railroads had sponsored a vigorous public-
ity campaign designed to procure legislation and enforcement
destructive of their competitors' trucking business.122 Despite the ob-
vious anticompetitive intent and effects of the railroads' conduct, the
Court held that the petitioning conduct did not subject the railroads to
liability under the Sherman Act.'
23
Two primary policy considerations were advanced in Noerr to sup-
port the finding of immunity for petitioning conduct. First, relying on
Parker's protection of valid (albeit anticompetitive) government ac-
tion, the Court inferred that petitioning immunity was necessary and
consistent with Congress' intent to protect political activity such as
petitioning the legislature or the executive to take the requested
(sometimes anticompetitive) action. 124 The Court declared that peti-
tioning immunity is premised on the constitutional right to petition
and that a legislative intent to abrogate such a right would not be im-
puted to Congress.125 Second, the Court observed that restricting "the
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representa-
tives" would "substantially impair" the power of the legislative and
executive branches to take the very anticompetitive actions allowed by
Parker.126
The Court in Noerr concluded that neither the defendants' an-
ticompetitive intent 27 nor the unethical nature of the lobbying2S
nopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to pri-
vate action, no violation of the Act can be made out.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135-36 (1961) (footnotes omitted) (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939)).
122. Id. at 128-31. The railroads employed a public relations firm that used various
front organizations to give the appearance of opposition to the trucking industry
through seemingly independent and spontaneous organizations.
123. The Noerr Court stated: "[T]he Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of
the railroads at least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of gov-
ernmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws." Id. at
138.
124. The Court noted that such political petitioning conduct was marked by an "essen-
tial dissimilarity" to conduct traditionally condemned by the Sherman Act: "such
devices as price-fixing agreements, boycotts, market-division agreements, and
other similar arrangements." Id. at 136. The Court stressed that: "The proscrip-
tions of the [Sherman] Act ... are not at all appropriate for application in the
political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislat-
ing with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities ..
Id. at 141.
125. Id. at 138. Nonetheless, the Noerr Court expressly declined to rest its decision on
the first amendment, basing it instead on construction of the Sherman Act. Id. at
132 n.6.
126. Id. at 137.
127. The Court noted that even where the petitioner's "sole purpose in seeking to
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barred the immunity protection required by these two policies. Even a
showing of injury in fact to the plaintiffs' competitive position did not
warrant application of the antitrust laws to legitimate petitioning.
129
The Noerr Court noted in dictum, however, that there may be an
exception to this petitioning immunity: "There may be situations in
which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing
governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relation-
ships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified."130
The holding and reasoning of Noerr were reaffirmed four years
later in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,3 1 a case in-
volving joint efforts by large coal mine operators and a mine workers
union to persuade the Secretary of Labor to set minimum wages for
employees in the coal industry. The Court held that, despite evidence
of harm to smaller coal companies resulting from the executive
branch decision, the successful petitioning was absolutely immune
from liability under the Sherman Act and the petitioners' anticompe-
titive purpose was legally irrelevant.32
influence the passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as
competitors," this fact could not "transform conduct otherwise lawful into a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 138-39. The precise holding of the Court on
this issue contained limiting language which is consistent with its later dictum
regarding "sham" petitioning- "We .. .hold that, at least insofar as the rail-
roads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality
was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had." Id. at
139-40 (emphasis added). See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
128. The Court found that the "deception" and "distortion" involved in the third-party
lobbying technique, although "fall[ing] far short of the ethical standards gener-
ally approved in this country," Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140 (1961), did not constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act: "Insofar as that Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that
condemns trade restraints, not political activity." Id. (emphasis added).
129. The Court stated specifically:
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a
campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be
the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against
whom the campaign is directed. ... To hold that the knowing infliction
of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tanta-
mount to outlawing all such campaigns. We have already discussed the
reasons which have led us to the conclusion that this has not been done
by anything in the Sherman Act.
Id. at 143-44.
130. Id. at 144. The Court pointed out that in the Noerr case there was no dispute that
the railroads had been engaged in "a genuine effort to influence legislation and
law enforcement practices." Id.
131. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
132. The Pennington Court noted specifically: "Nothing could be clearer from the
Court's opinion [in Noerr] than that anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the
conduct there involved .... Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the most important aspect of the decision in Pennington
was the Court's willingness to extend immunity to petitioning activi-
ties even though the petitioning was part of a larger scheme intended
to reduce competition.133 The Court stated: "Joint efforts to influ-
ence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though in-
tended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either
standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act."1
34
The third and most recent major Supreme Court decision involving
petitioning immunity, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited,135 extended the Noerr-Pennington principle to state and
federal agencies and the courts.136 The Court also shifted the under-
pinnings of the doctrine away from Noerr's statutory construction to
reliance on constitutional values within the first amendment.13 7 How-
ever, the Court found that the conduct alleged fit within the "sham"
exception and was, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the Sherman
Act.1 38 Thus, the Court cut back its earlier position in Pennington,
that purpose and intent were irrelevant to a finding of immunity.1
3 9
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose." Id. at 669-70
(emphasis added).
133. The joint effort of large coal companies and the UMAW to injure competing small
coal producers allegedly proceeded along several fronts. The small producers
claimed that: (1) the defendants had urged the TVA to halt coal purchases on the
"spot" market (harmful to small producer who lacked financial resources to com-
pete effectively in the "term" market); (2) the defendants had initiated price-
cutting campaigns against small producers; and (3) the large coal companies had
refused to buy, sell, or market non-union coal. Id. at 660-61.
134. Id. at 670.
135. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Plaintiff highway carriers alleged concerted action by other
trucking companies to institute actions in state and federal proceedings to resist
and defeat applications by plaintiffs to acquire, transfer, or register operating
rights. Id. at 509.
136. Id. at 510-11.
137. Indeed, the California Motor Transport Court made no reference to Parker, in-
stead expounding on the scope of the constitutional right to petition:
Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Gov-
ernment. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right of petition .... We conclude that it would be destructive of rights
of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests
may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and pro-
cedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes
and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic
interests vis-a-vis their competitors .... That right [of access], as indi-
cated, is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 510-11, 513.
138. The Court stated that proceedings instituted "with or without probable cause,
and regardless of the merits of the cases" may be evidence of a "purpose to de-
prive the competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and courts" and would
thus fall within the sham exception to Noerr. Id. at 512.
139. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
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At least in an adjudicatory context, petitioners who do not merely
seek to influence public officials, but who seek "to bar their competi-
tors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp
that decision-making process" will not be protected under Noerr im-
munity.14 0 The Court in California Motor Transport also emphasized
that the nature of the governmental body being petitioned is relevant
to the availability of Noerr immunity. Certain types of unethical con-
duct, such as misrepresentation, which are permitted in the political/
legislative context, "are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory
process."1 4
1
Determining whether particular petitioning conduct falls outside
the protection of the Noerr political protection doctrine has been the
source of considerable difficulty for lower courts. The application of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its exceptions are examined in the
following section.
B. Exceptions to the Application of the Noerr-Pennington
Immunity Doctrine
Although the right of private parties to petition the government
for anticompetitive results has been stated in broad terms, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine has been limited in application by the courts in
several respects. 42 The purpose of this subsection is to describe
briefly the grounds upon which courts may find particular petitioning
conduct to be outside the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
and therefore subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. For pur-
poses of this Article, the "exceptions" to Noerr-Pennington immunity
have been grouped into four categories: (1) the "abuse of process" ex-
ception; (2) the "co-conspiracy" exception; (3) the "commercial" ex-
ception; and (4) the "sham" exception.1 43
140. California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
141. Id. at 513. The Court identified certain conduct that would result in sanctions
(perjury of witness) or would constitute antitrust violations in an adjudicatory
setting (use of a fraudulently obtained patent to exclude a competitor, conspiracy
with a license authority to eliminate competitor, bribery of a public purchasing
agent). Id. at 512.
142. A number of commentators have discussed the application ahd scope of the No-
err-Pennington doctrine. See, e.g., Crawford & Tschoepe, The Erosion of the No-
err-Pennington Immunity, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 291 (1981); Fischel, supra note 119;
Higginbotham, The Noerr-Pennington Problem: A View From the Bench, 46 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 730 (1977); McMahon, supra note 57; Note, Application of the Sher-
man Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 HARv. L. REV. 847
(1968).
143. The classification of particular petitioning conduct as an exception to Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity is subject to wide variation among Courts and commentators,




1. The "Abuse of Process" Exception
Some courts have held that unlawful activity by defendants seek-
ing official action from a governmental body results in a loss of Noerr-
Pennington immunity. For example, in Westborough Mall, Inc. v.
City of Cape Girardeau,44 the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant
private shopping center developers were not protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity because the allegations in the complaint raised a
reasonable inference of unlawful conduct.1 45 The court found that
any legitimate lobbying efforts "may have been accompanied by illegal
or fraudulent actions,"146 so that it was improper to grant the defend-
ants absolute immunity at the summary judgment stage. More specifi-
cally, private parties who furnish false information to administrative
agencies for use in a decisionmaking process will frequently be sub-
jected to antitrust liability without the protection of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity. 4
7
Other courts have refused to bar the application of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity despite similar unethical or unlawful conduct.1 48
Because such decisions cannot always be factually distinguished from
those "abuse of process" cases denying Noerr-Pennington immunity, it
is reasonable to conclude that courts are free to exercise considerable
144. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment
for municipal and private defendants).
145. The court determined that city officials may have been induced by the defendant
shopping center developers to illegally revert plaintiff developer's commercial
zoning designation and that this reversion may have resulted from other than
legitimate lobbying. Id. at 746.
146. Id. (emphasis added). See also Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters & Helpers Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.) (Noerr-Pennington
doctrine not "intended to protect those who employ illegal means to influence
their representatives in government"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
147. See, e.g., Clipper Exxpress v. Rock Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d
1240, 1259-63 (9th Cir. 1982) (fraudulent information in rate protest relates back
to original claim and not time barred), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227-28 (1983); Israel
v. Baxter Labs, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274-80 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (misrepresentation and
suppression of information by drug manufacturer during lobbying of Federal
Drug Administration to reject application of competitor's new drug); Woods Ex-
ploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir.
1971) (filing false information reports with state administrative agency), cerL de-
nied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
148. See, e.g., First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439,
1446-47 (8th Cir. 1983) (misrepresentations and false statements in the context of
legislative lobbying protected under Noerr-Pennington immunity), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1042 (1984); Bustop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 521 F.
Supp. 989, 995-96 (S.C.N.Y. 1981) (allegations of pressure on government officials
and actions in response within Noerr-Pennington); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated
Milk Producers, 390 F. Supp. 696, 704-05 (D. Colo. 1975) (bribery and illegal cam-
paign contributions not grounds for antitrust liability because defendant lacked
motive of harming plaintiff competitor).
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discretion in determining whether a petitioner's conduct will be sub-
ject to antitrust scrutiny, particularly in a legislative context.
2. The "Co-conspiracy" Exception
The Supreme Court has alluded to the existence of a "co-conspir-
acy" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine on at least two occa-
sions.149 The Court has, however, never held explicitly that where
government officials have a substantial personal interest in the deci-
sion being sought, and/or where they play an active role in the private
defendants' petitioning conduct, such involvement by government of-
ficials will bar Noerr-Pennington immunity.
The lower courts are split as to whether an allegation of a govern-
ment official's participation in a "conspiracy" is a basis for denying
petitioners the protection of Noerr-Pennington immunity.1 50 Cases
from the Seventh and Third Circuits illustrate the divergent views of
the courts regarding this exception.
In Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc.,151 the plaintiff raised
an antitrust challenge to the denial of its application for a cable televi-
sion franchise, alleging a conspiracy among the mayor, an alderman,
and the successful applicant.152 Emphasizing the political/legislative
context, the Seventh Circuit held that the petitioning conduct was
protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,153 despite allegations
149. In United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Court
observed that the government decision that the defendants had allegedly con-
spired to procure "was the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-
conspirator." Id. at 671 (emphasis added). Later, in California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the Court, in identifying specific un-
ethical conduct that might result in antitrust violations, noted that a "[c]onspiracy
with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor may also result in an anti-
trust transgression." Id. at 513.
This issue dates back to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where, in the
context of state action immunity, the Court observed that the case contained "no
question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agree-
ment or combination by others for restraint of trade." Id. at 351-52.
150. The problem of defining what constitutes a conspiratorial involvement by the
government official is a threshold determination of no small difficulty. See supra
notes 101-18 and accompanying text (conspiracy exception in Parker context). It
should be noted that Noerr-Pennington applies only in the context of bona fide
petitioning for government action and does not immunize conduct which does not
involve petitioning. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cin-
cinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664, 669 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Noerr-Pennington not applicable
where no concerted effort to influence public officials but, rather, a contractual
agreement between two parties, one of whom is a municipality).
151. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
152. The complaint alleged that the public officials were persuaded by private parties
to support the CATV application and to oppose the plaintiff's application and that
these officials were given compaign contributions in exchange for such undertak-
ings. Id. at 230.
153. Id. at 230-31.
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of misrepresentations and campaign contributions. The court ob-
served that if an agreement to induce legislative action were deemed a
"conspiracy," this would "in practice abrogate the Noerr doctrine." 154
The court reasoned that every successful effort to influence legislative
action would result in government officials becoming "co-conspira-
tors."155 The Metro Cable court viewed the government officials' con-
duct as clearly within the state action parameters of Parker: granting
a franchise to defendant and refusing a franchise to plaintiff as au-
thorized by state law.156 Moreover, the court implied that the govern-
ment officials in Metro Cable were not active participants in a
conspiracy.1
57
Other courts have concluded also that government officials' mere
economic or political interest in the outcome of decision-making is not
sufficient to bar Noerr-Pennington immunity for the petitioner.
15 8
These courts have applied a similar "active participation versus mere
interest" standard, but have held that economic or personal interest in
the decision by government officials constitutes active involvement in
the conspiracy, and that the petitioning immunity of Noerr-Pen-
nington is not available in such cases. The Third Circuit adopted this
position in Duke & Co. v. Foerster,59 a case in which the plaintiff al-
leged that he had been barred from selling malt beverages in munici-
pal facilities because of a conspiracy involving competitors and local
goverment officials. The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the complaint,160 holding that Parker immunity was not
154. Id. at 230.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 228-29.
157. The court rejected the claim that government officials responding to a successful
petitioning effort (even where supplemented by campaign contributions and mis-
representations) would constitute a conspiracy and bar the application of Noerr-
Pennington immunity. The absence of active participation was emphasized to the
point of redundancy:
[We] can find no rational basis... for holding that such participation by
a member of the legislative body as is here alleged should cause the
Sherman Act to apply to an effort to induce governmental action that is
otherwise protected by Noerr. Nothing in the Noerr opinion or any other
case of which we are aware suggests any reason for believing that Con-
gress, not having intended the Sherman Act to apply to combined efforts
to induce legislative action, did intend the Act to apply if a member of
the legislative body agreed to support those efforts.
Id. at 230.
158. See, e.g., Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663
F.2d 253, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Sun Valley Dispo-
sal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342 (9th Cir. 1969); Hopkinsville
Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543, 547 (W.D. Ky.
1982).
159. 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975).
160. The district court had granted a motion to dismiss the complaint as to the govern-
mental defendants on the basis of Parker. Id. at 1279.
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available to protect the government officials' conduct.' 6 ' The Court
went on to state that Noerr-Pennington would not protect the private
petitioners because "the complaint goes beyond mere allegations of of-
ficial persuasion by anticompetitive lobbying and claims official partic-
ipation with private individuals in a scheme to restrain trade.... .,162
Ironically, the record in Duke actually shows less active involvement
by the governmental officials than in Metro Cable.1 63
A broad application of the co-conspirator exception permits a
plaintiff challenging the defendant's petitioning conduct to avoid early
dismissal. Courts following Duke will conclude that allegations of a
conspiracy involving public officials will preclude an automatic grant
of Noerr-Pennington immunity as a matter of law.' 64 Obviously, the
risk of being denied Noerr-Pennington immunity can chill the right to
petition for government action.165
A number of courts have refused to recognize a co-conspirator ex-
161. The court's conclusion on the Parker immunity issue is questionable and high-
lights the broad discretion available to courts in deciding whether particular gov-
ernmental conduct exceeds statutory authority. In Duke, the court held that the
city's statutory power to select products to be sold through concessions in their
facilities did not mandate or permit discrimination against certain suppliers. Id.
at 1281. This conclusion is an example of the most restrictive application of the
Parker "authorization" requirement. It is difficult to construe such a power to
select certain products as not conferring the correlative right to deal with particu-
lar suppliers.
162. Id. at 1282.
163. Indeed, the Duke Court seemed confused in its treatment of the Parker and No-
err-Pennington doctrines. The court, in dicta, noted that Noerr-Pennington im-
munity could apply to the governmental entity "which 'listens to anticompetitive
pleas,"' id., a proposition of non-petitioning immunity without support in case
law or commentary. The court cited Parker and Goldfarb as origins of its reason-
ing on the application of Noerr-Pennington immunity, despite the fact that such
cases involved state action immunity. Even the court's interpretation of this
Parker line of cases was muddled. The court concluded that actions of a local unit
of government must be "compelled by the state," a conclusion clearly at odds with
case law. Id. (emphasis added). See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
Finally, the court cited Harmon v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 379 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964),
for its conclusion regarding official participation in a conspiracy, despite the fact
that the Ninth Circuit had earlier indicated that Harmon was no longer good law.
See Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342-43 (9th
Cir. 1969).
164. See Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 745 (N.D.
Iowa 1979), afjfd in relevant part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
165. At least one commentator has stongly criticized the co-conspirator exception be-
cause of this chilling effect:
Acceptance of the co-conspirator theory would mean that although com-
petitors have a constitutional right to petition the government, the right
could be lost if the petitioning is successful, because the government offi-
cials might be labeled co-conspirators, and Noerr protection lost ....
[I]n most cases the co-conspirator exception is unworkable and should
not be recognized.
Fischel, supra note 119, at 115.
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ception, either by rejecting this exception outright,166 or by finding
alternative grounds for denying Noerr-Pennington immunity.1 67 The
better view appears to be that followed by Metro Cable and its prog-
eny, which protects a broad right to petition and refuses to find a "con-
spiracy" where there is a mere coincidence of views between
government officials and private petitioners. Such protection can be
properly extended to actions in which the government officials have
an interest. As the Ninth Circuit has said:
[L]ocal government units such as city councils and county boards are seldom
completely free from personal interest and outside influences, but the Sher-
man Act was not intended to regulate this type of activity. . . . [A]s long as
the official's action is itself lawful, the action is without the scope of the fed-
eral antitrust laws, even if the motive for the action is a personal one.
1 6 8
A final conceptual note regarding the co-conspirator exception is
helpful in understanding the confusion that is sometimes evident in
the cases discussing and applying this exception. Some courts have
considered the co-conspirator exception to be a subcategory of the
"sham" exception. Thus there is a risk of misapplying "sham" ele-
ments, such as purpose or intent, to the conduct of a public official
who is alleged to be a participant in a "conspiracy."1 69 Obviously, such
nonstandard classifications tend to further obfuscate an already hazy
conceptual scheme of exceptions to Noerr-Pennington.
3. The "Commercial" Exception
A number of lower federal courts and commentators have recog-
nized yet another basis for denying immunity under Noerr-Pen-
nington for certain petitioning conduct. The commercial exception
rests on the notion that the right to petition is properly immune from
antitrust scrutiny only where the government action sought is truly
political in nature. By contrast, when the government is functioning
in a proprietary manner, the right of a private party to enter the
"political" arena to advance his self-interest is substantially dimin-
ished, and the petitioning conduct is therefore subject to the antitrust
laws.170 One commentator has summarized the rationale for this dis-
166. See, e.g., Alphin Aircraft, Inc. v. Henson, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) C 66,161 (D.
Md. 1984).
167. See, e.g., Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733, 746 (8th Cir.
1982) (declining to base decision on co-conspirator doctrine but denying immunity
because of alleged illegality and fraud in lobbying).
168. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341, 342 (9th Cir.
1969).
169. See, e.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal.
1981), affd, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 1195, 1209 (D.D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 929 (1982); Huron Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1313
(E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).




The purposes of government expenditures are properly influenced by political
pressures, but, once the purposes are defined politically, a government is best
able to accomplish those purposes by behaving in accordance with strictly eco-
nomic criteria. Thus, where concerted effort is employed to influence the ex-
ecutive in its role as a purchaser in the economy, the considerations suggesting
antitrust immunity for action in an exclusively political context are inappo-
site. Similarly, a legislative body may occasionally participate directly in the
economy as a consumer on behalf of the government, as when a city council
approves a contract. To this extent, attempts to influence its conduct should
also be subject to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act.
1 7 1
The roots of the commercial exception can be traced to Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,172 in which the antitrust
laws were held applicable to a conspiracy involving "private commer-
cial activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure the pas-
sage or enforcement of laws."'173 The first case to hold that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine will not protect private petitioners when the gov-
ernment is functioning in a commercial/proprietary capacity was
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 174 In /hit-
ten, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Paddock, had persuaded
the city to adopt exclusive bid specifications that only the defendant
could satisfy. The court rejected Paddock's contention that its conduct
was protected by petitioning immunity. 75 The court reasoned that
the local government did not require political input where the policy
issues regarding swimming pool construction had already been
determined.176
The difficulty of defining commercial versus governmental/polit-
nington doctrine can be found in Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immu-
nity and Proprietary Government Activity, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 749 (1981)
(arguing for abandonment of the commercial activity exception in order to pro-
tect lobbying and preserve the constitutional right to petition).
171. Note, supra note 142, at 851 (emphasis added) (arguing that the proper test for
whether to extend antitrust immunity to attempt to influence government offi-
cials is whether the requested decision is to be made in a political or economic
framework).
172. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
173. Id. at 707. The decision in Pennington three years later appears to undercut the
reasoning in Continental Ore; the attempts to influence the government in Pen-
nington were held to be exempt from the antitrust laws, even though one of the
objectives of the petitioning was to influence the purchasing decisions of the
TVA.
174. 424 F.2d 25, 31-34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
175. Id. at 32. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the conduct was pro-
tected under the Parker state action doctrine because the statute required com-
petitive bidding. Id. at 31.
176. The court observed: "By 'enforcement of laws' we understand some significant
policy determination in the application of a statute, not a technical decision about
the best kind of weld to use in a swimming pool gutter." Id. at 32. See also Pine-
hurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543, 556 (M.D.N.C. 1979)
(denying Noerr-Pennington immunity where defendants were not seeking legis-
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ical activity has resulted in inconsistent results in the lower federal
courts. For example, some courts have applied the commercial excep-
tion where the governmental activity was apparently noncommer-
cial.177 Another significant problem arises because of the difficulty in
defining the scope of commercial activity. Application of the commer-
cial exception may impinge on first amendment rights to free speech
where antitrust liability is extended to political conduct.1 78 The com-
mercial exception has been applied where the government functions
as purchaser 79 and seller.80 However, a compelling argument can be
made for applying the commercial exception less rigorously when the
government functions as a seller.181
Inconsistency results among courts applying the commercial ex-
ception because of its inherently vague scope. In addition, the fact
lation but were trying to "effectuate a favorable disposition or implementation of
the statutory framework that was already in existence").
177. See, e.g., Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (attempt to
influence FDA where the agency was functioning in governmental/regulatory ca-
pacity); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 484 F.
Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1980) (attempts to shift the focus of administrative decision-
making from general policies to discretionary judgments responsive to commer-
cial considerations are not protected under Noerr-Pennington).
178. Commercial speech has been accorded constitutional recognition, albeit to a
lesser degree than political speech. Generally, commercial speech is unprotected
if deceptive, false, or misleading. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The problem is that the "truth"
of commercial speech in a petitioning/political context is much more difficult to
ascertain than in a retail customer advertising context. See Comment, supra note
170, at 765-66 (emphasis added):
[Tihe imposition of restraints on speech targeted toward commercial
government activity under the commercial exception chills constitution-
ally protected speech. Input into the political process is impeded if a
private party is uncertain if the government unit which is a party to the
transaction is to be characterized as commercially motivated or purely
governmental. A private party unable to properly define commercial
government behavior prior to approaching a government body may not
proceed since Sherman Act liability is possible. This is a powerful deter-
rent to participating in the political process.
179. See, e.g., Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); George R. Whit-
ten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert de-
nied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
180. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
181. It has been suggested that when a government agency is acting as a buyer it usu-
ally operates under competitive bidding statutes. Therefore, when purchasing
goods and services under requirements to minimize costs, the government is in
many respects identical to a private-sector purchaser and may properly be subject
to antitrust liability. When the government is selling goods, however, other social
objectives may be dominant (for example, the convenience and reliability of an
integrated transportation system), and antitrust liability may defeat a goal which




that other courts simply do not apply the commercial exception leads
to contrary results on substantially similar facts.s2
An apparent majority of courts do not apply the commercial excep-
tion. Instead, these courts grant broad petitioning immunity in a wide
range of government activity contexts. This is probably the proper
view given the uncertain and chilling effects of barring petitioning im-
munity through the application of the commercial exception. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, has strongly rejected the commercial ex-
ception to Noerr-Pennington. It recognized the objectives of petition-
ing immunity as the preservation of first amendment rights and the
free flow of communication to government decision-making, even in a
commercial context.1 8 3 Although one can theoretically posit a bar to
petitioning immunity "[w]here the government is making purely eco-
nomic decisions as a consumer in the economy," 8 4 in practice it is vir-
tually impossible to determine whether particular governmental
conduct of a commercial nature is devoid of any policy ramifications.
4. The "Sham" Exception
The final category of exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity,
the "sham" exception, is perhaps the category most lacking clear defi-
nition of scope and contours. 8 5 The sham exception was first stated in
182. Compare Household Goods Carrier Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971)
(lobbying federal agency to discontinue government purchase of competitor's
product granted immunity under Noerr-Pennington despite commercial context),
and Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1983-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) q 65,525 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Noerr-Pennington immunity applied
to petitioning for governmental adoption of product standards and building code
specifications), with George R. Whitten, Jr. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970) (adoption by public body of defendant contractor's specifi-
cations and efforts to sell products under competitive bidding do not bring de-
fendant within exemption), cert denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
183. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 693 F.2d 84,88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983). The Ninth Circuit also noted that a distinction be-
tween implementing and formulating policy cannot properly be invoked to deny
petitioning immunity. This was undoubtedly a reference to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), a decision that
can be criticized for not recognizing the discretionary and policymaking nature of
much governmental enforcement-implementation conduct.
184. See Fischel, supra note 119, at 117 (emphasis added).
185. Indeed, the sham exception has sometimes been interpreted to include the co-
conspirator exception. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. One pair of
commentators demonstrated their uncertainty about the contours of the sham
exception by stating two distinctly different definitions of the sham exception
within the same article. The authors first emphasized the unique nature of the
sham exception and distinguished "other limitations" (equivalent to what has
been referred to in this Article as the "abuse of process" exception):
The key distinction between the sham exception and these other lim-
itations is the difference between improper ends and improper means. If
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dictum in Noerr and later applied in California Motor Transport.8 6 It
has generally been applied by the lower courts to deny petitioning im-
munity where the attempts to induce governmental administrative or
judicial action are not actually undertaken for the purpose of influenc-
ing such tribunals, but instead are intended to harass, deter, and bar
competitors from free and meaningful access to the tribunals.187 De-
termining the genuineness of the petitioning activity involves signifi-
cant factual questions 8 8
Despite the language in Noerr that intent is irrelevant to the deter-
muination of petitioning immunity,1 8 9 California Motor Transport 9o
and subsequent lower court opinions have made clear that the defend-
ant's intent is the principal criterion in judging whether a defendant's
conduct constitutes a sham.191 Where the defendant's good faith in
the defendant's goal in seeking governmental action is not the action at
all, but rather to injure its competitor or to obtain a competitive advan-
tage, then the defendant's petitioning may properly be characterized as a
sham. On the other hand, even if the defendant truly wants the govern-
mental action sought, certain means of attempting to obtain that relief
are so improper that they are beyond the realm of political activity for
antitrust purposes.
Kintner & Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for Private Requests for Governmental
Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 U. CALIF. DA-
vIs L. REV. 549, 566 (1984).
Five pages later, the authors articulated a "sham" definition that not only ig-
nored the previous distinction but contradicted it, stating a definition broad
enough to include both the "sham" and the "abuse of process" exception: "The
sham exception can apply either when the defendant has no real desire to prevail
in the proceedings, but is using them to injure competitors, or when the defend-
ant has engaged in certain prohibited conduct." Id. at 571.
186. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
187. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1972).
Given that this exception was first recognized in Noerr in the context of petition-
ing legislative and executive bodies, the exception is likely to apply in such situa-
tions as well. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (sham
exception applies to "activities external to or abusive of the legislative, adminis-
trative or judicial process" (emphasis added)).
In practice, however, legislative/political petitioning is granted much broader
immunity with much less, if any, regard for the petitioning methods used or the
petitioner's intent. Thus, the sham exception is unlikely to be invoked success-
fully in a legislative/political subject.
188. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1253
(9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
189. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687 (4th Cir.
1982) ("misrepresentations, to fall within the sham exception. . . ,must be made
with the requisite intent"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1129 (1983); Mark Aero, Inc. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[t]he fundamental




seeking governmental action is a "significant motivating factor" un-
derlying the action, the sham exception will usually be avoided.19 2
Conversely, where the "petitioning" conduct alleged shows an absence
of good faith, this may be sufficient to trigger application of the sham
exception, subjecting the petitioner's conduct to antitrust scrutiny.
193
The federal courts appear to be expanding the application of the
sham exception. While a detailed analysis of the evolution and appli-
cation of the sham exception is beyond the scope of this Article, sev-
eral recent developments illustrate the extent to which the sham
exception can be liberally used by courts to deny Noerr-Pennington
immunity.
First, despite the reference in California Motor Transport to "a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims,"194 a number of courts recently
have concluded that a single action can satisfy the sham exception.
195
Second, it may not be necessary to actually institute a proceeding to
constitute a sham. In Alexander v. National Farmers Organization,196
the Eighth Circuit ruled that threats of litigation, designed to deter
customers of the competitor, fell within the sham exception. The
court reasoned that the threats were not intended to influence govern-
ment action but were directed at and intended to influence the parties
threatened. 9 7 Finally, although the groundless or unsuccessful na-
ture of an attempt to obtain governmental action can be evidence of
bad faith or sham conduct,198 recent decisions indicate that the sham
exception may be appropriate to deny petitioning immunity, even
where the action was successful.19 9 The most important determina-
tion, overriding even the ultimate outcome of the alleged sham pro-
192. Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983).
193. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 462 U.S. 1129 (1983).
194. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
195. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1983); MCI Com-
munications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1154-55 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). One commentator has suggested that this trend
has stemmed from the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), in which the plurality and dissenting opinions
suggest that at least six members of the Court might hold that a single action
constitutes a sham. See McMahon, supra note 57, at 554-55.
196. 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983).
197. Id. at 1195. See also Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 460 F. Supp.
1359, 1386 (D. Hawaii 1978) (threatening competitor's customers with litigation is
outside protection of Noerr-Pennington).
198. See, e.g., Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 (9th Cir. 1980).
199. See, e.g., Sunergy Communities, Inc. v. Aristek Properties, Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 1327,
1331 (D. Colo. 1982) (success on the merits is only one factor to be considered in
whether to apply the sham exception); Ross v. Bremer, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,746 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (even though action successful, other factors must be




ceeding, appears to be whether the action was initiated automatically,
without regard to the merits of the action or the probability of
success. 2
00
Much like the other exceptions, the sham exception is generally
applied to permit antitrust scrutiny of actions that are characterized as
undeserving of Noerr-Pennington immunity. Inherent in this excep-
tion, like the others, is the potential for the courts to deny protection
to legitimate petitions for government action. Of particular difficulty
in applying the sham exception is a court's evaluation of the propriety
of the defendant's intent-a subjective determination capable of
widely varying outcomes on similar facts. To the extent that the sham
exception is properly limited to "constitutionally valueless activity,
such as deliberate misrepresentations, bribery, and the knowing asser-
tion of a baseless legal claim,"201 broad protection of first amendment
freedoms can be afforded and the public antitrust policy favoring com-
petition can be preserved.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARKER AND
NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINES: COMMON
ROOTS, SEPARATE BRANCHES
A. Historical Context-Companion Doctrines
It is not surprising that the courts have often presumed a natural
and close relationship between the state action immunity doctrine
based on Parker and the petitioning immunity doctrine based on No-
err and Pennington. In fact, the Noerr decision cited Parker for its
starting premise that "where a restraint upon trade or monopolization
is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private ac-
tion, no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be made out."202 The
Court in Noerr then concluded that it was "equally clear that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating
together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to
take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a re-
straint or monopoly."203 Finally, the mutually supportive nature of
the relationship between state action immunity and petitioning immu-
200. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1254 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court in California Motor Transport seemed
to place significant importance on the initiation of proceedings "with or without
probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the case." California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972). The Court reasoned
that "the nature of the views pressed... may bear upon a purpose to deprive the
competitor of meaningful access to the agencies and courts." Id.
201. See Fischel, supra note 119, at 122.
202. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,




nity was described by the Court in Noerr: "[S]uch a holding [barring
petitioning immunity] would substantially impair the power of gov-
ernment to take actions through its legislature and executive that op-
erate to restrain trade."2 04 In other words, the Court reasoned that
petitioning immunity is necessary to preserve the very power pro-
tected by Parker: the power of government entities to take anticom-
petitive actions. Without petitioning immunity, government would be
denied the benefits derived from public input, such as comprehensive
information from informed sources, vigorous lobbying from interested
parties, and open decision-making processes.
Nonetheless, the decision in California Motor Transport2O5 made it
clear that the Court had developed a new view of petitioning immu-
nity. The Noerr doctrine now had clear constitutional underpinnings,
not the statutory construction roots of Parker.20 6 Thus, there can be
no question that the two doctrines have been defined by the Court as
having separate, but related, legal bases.207
Despite differences in the purpose and origin of the two doctrines,
courts have sometimes blurred the distinctions between them and
have reached divergent conclusions regarding their relationship. For
example, in E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Au-
thority,2O8 the First Circuit cited both the Noerr and Pennington deci-
sions as cases that followed the state action principle of Parker.2
0 9
The court first found that the actions of the Authority, a governmen-
tal body, were immune under Parker. The court then rejected the an-
titrust claims against the private defendants, reasoning that because
204. Id. at 137.
205. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. In fact, the Court in California
Motor Transport made no explicit reference to Parker except in a concurring
opinion by Justice Stewart, who noted that the decision to grant immunity to the
railroads in Noerr "was a corollary of our decisions in [Rock Royal Co-op and
Parker], holding that when a monopoly or restraint of trade is the result of valid
governmental action, there cannot be an antitrust violation." California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 n.3 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
207. The lower federal courts have frequently acknowledged the distinct origins of the
Parker and Noerr-Pennington immunities. See, e.g., In re Airport Car Rental An-
titrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 87 (9th Cir. 1982); Feminist Women's Health Center,
Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1978). Commentators also have
consistently recognized the separate roots of these two doctrines. See, e.g., McMa-
hon, supra note 57, at 532; Comment, supra note 170, at 752.
208. 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). In Wiggins, the Authority
signed an exclusive contract with another defendant for fixed base operations at
the airport managed by the Authority. The plaintiff, Wiggins, sued under the
antitrust laws.
209. The Wiggins court's view of Parker and Noerr-Pennington as a single line of
authority is understandable when one considers that the constitutional roots of
Noerr-Pennington were not clearly defined until California Motor Transport, six
years after the decision in Wiggins.
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the government's conduct was immune, it would be unreasonable to
hold that the private defendants (who had acted with the government)
were liable under the antitrust laws.2 1o In effect, the Wiggins court
protected the private defendant by a broad reading of Parker rather
than under a separate petitioning immunity.
The Tenth Circuit displayed a similar blurred view of Parker and
Noerr-Pennington in Semke v. Enid Automobile Dealers Associa-
tion.211 The court ruled that the trial court had been correct in hold-
ing that the petitioners acted validly and under the protection of not
only Noerr-Pennington-California Motor Transport but also
Parker.21 2 The Semke court's view of these cases as a single line of
authority was illustrated by its reference to the "exemption ex-
pounded in the Parker-Noerr line of cases."
213
In Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford Inc.,214 the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated explicitly the logical result of viewing Parker and Noerr-
Pennington as closely related and interdependent doctrines: "Since
the governmental actions of the city council and its committees were
not themselves subject to the Sherman Act, the same was true under
Noerr of concerted efforts to induce those governmental actions, even
though those efforts had the anticompetitive purpose and effect al-
leged by plaintiff. ... 215 This case suggests strongly that petition-
ing immunity for the private parties follows rather automatically upon
a finding of state action immunity for the governmental body.216
A recent district court opinion stated this relationship as follows:
"It will be seen that Noerr-Pennington immunity presupposes Parker
v. Brown immunity: if the governmental or agency action is valid as
under state authority (despite anticompetitive effects), then seeking to
influence the action and a successful outcome are also exempt."
2 17
This position is even stronger than that expressed in Metro Cable be-
210. Id. at 56.
211. 456 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1972). In Semke, new car dealers persuaded state officials
to enjoin the plaintiff, a dealer of used cars, from selling new cars in violation of
the state law requiring state licensing of all new car dealers.
212. Id. at 1365.
213. Id. at 1367.
214. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975), affg 375 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1974). In Metro Cable,
the unsuccessful applicant for a cable television franchise sued the successful ap-
plicant and city officials. The district court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss.
215. Id. at 229. The court went on to recognize both the sham and the co-conspirator
exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity, but held that neither exception ap-
plied in that case.
216. See also Trans World Assoc. v. City & County of Denver, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,293 (D. Colo. 1974) (city's immunity under Parker to negotiate airport car
rental concessions and to contract with private defendants resulted in a similar
immunity for such private defendants).
217. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1315 (E.D. Mich.
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 65:330
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
cause it asserts that Parker state action immunity is not only a suffi-
cient but is necessary condition to the availability of a Noerr-
Pennington petitioning immunity.
B. Noerr-Pennington Conditioned on Parker: Parallel
Restrictions on Immunity
The close linkage between Parker state action and Noerr-Pen-
nington petitioning immunities can be a real benefit to the private de-
fendant where state action immunity has been found. Such a linkage
can, however, be used to deny petitioning immunity for private parties
when a court has applied the Parker doctrine restrictively to bar state
action immunity for the government's conduct.218
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette in 1978, the availa-
bility of state action immunity for cities has been much more re-
stricted.219 However, even before the decision in Lafayette there was
a suggestion that a narrower application of state action immunity for
cities should result in a parallel curtailment of Noerr-Pennington im-
munity for the petitioning private parties.
In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria,2 20 plain-
tiffs, existing concessionaires, alleged that the local park district had
agreed with defendant GSM, a potential concessionaire, that GSM
would submit economically unrealistic bids for concession rights at
five municipal golf courses. Plaintiffs alleged that GSM's phony bids
were intended to extract a larger concession fee from the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs refused to pay the higher fee and were terminated. The
park district granted concession rights to GSM but at a price substan-
tially less than GSM's original bid.221
The Seventh Circuit first determined that the park district was not
automatically entitled to immunity under Parker.222 The court also
rejected GSM's claim of Noerr-Pennington immunity for three rea-
sons: (1) the private petitioner's participation in a scheme that it knew
would be used to coerce plaintiff into conduct violative of the antitrust
laws;223 (2) the limited applicability of the first amendment's "right to
218. Indeed, the Parker state action immunity as applied to cities has been consist-
ently narrowed since the Court's decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
220. 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), rein-
stated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
221. Id. at 585-86.
222. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), and also
the Third Circuit's decision in Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir.
1975).
223. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. of Peoria, 557 F.2d 580, 593 (7th Cir.
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petition" protection for a "contract proposal to a government unit;"2 2 4
and (3) as an alternative ground, the probable application of the
"sham" exception to deny Noerr-Pennington immunity.225
The rejection of Noerr-Pennington immunity on the facts of Kurek
was probably correct since it could rest on any one of three exceptions
to that doctrine.226 But Kurek is important for a different reason.
The court in Kurek advanced the proposition that the absence of
Parker immunity necessarily limits the applicability of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity:
Our determination that the Park District and its officials had no state man-
date or authority to engage in the activities attacked here necessarily reduces
the applicability of the reasoning of Noerr to the degree it is based on the need
of governmental units for citizen input in making decisions that Parker holds
to be outside the scope of the Sherman Act.
2 2 7
In other words, the court concluded that Noerr-Pennington immunity
should be available only to petitions for governmental acts not subject
to scrutiny under the antitrust laws, i.e., where the government is im-
mune under Parker.
228
This position (conditioning Noerr-Pennington immunity on the
availability of Parker immunity) was restated two years later in Pine-
hurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Services, Inc.229 The district court in
Pinehurst Airlines denied state action immunity under Parker be-
cause the anticompetitive conduct lacked state authorization. The
court then denied Noerr-Pennington immunity, apparently applying a
form of commercial/proprietary exception.230 Finally, in a footnote,
the court observed that the Lafayette decision would curtail Noerr-
1977). The court concluded that such involvement was "not essentially dissimilar
to activities the Sherman Act was meant to proscribe." Id.
224. Id. at 594.
225. Id.
226. On the facts of Kurek, the co-conspirator exception, the commercial activity ex-
ception, and the sham exception could each provide a basis for denying Noerr-
Pennington immunity.
227. Id. at 593.
228. The only authority cited for this proposition was the Third Circuit's decision in
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975). However, the portion
of the Duke decision cited discussed only the co-conspirator exception to Noerr-
Pennington and not the broader propositions stated in Kurek regarding linkage
to the Parker doctrine. Moreover, the reasoning and conclusions of the court in
Duke are subject to criticism. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
229. 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979). In Pinehurst Airlines, plaintiff alleged a con-
spiracy among the county board, the county airport committee, and another air-
line to prevent plaintiff's access to the airport as a fixed base operator and to
strengthen private defendant's monopoly as a fixed base operator.
230. Although not expressly following the line of commercial exception cases, the
Pinehurst Airlines court concluded that petitioning immunity was not appropri-
ate where private parties were not actually seeking to influence legislation but
were only seeking "to effectuate a favorable disposition or implementation of the
statutory framework that was already in existence." Id. at 556.
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Pennington due to that doctrine's linkage to and dependence upon the
Parker doctrine:
[Tihe decision in Lafayette ... may have serious repercussions for the scope
and weight of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as well. . . . The implications
of Lafayette add an entirely new dimension to municipal liability and indi-
rectly to the liability of private persons or entities that seek to influence pub-
lic action of a legislative or administrative nature.
2 3 1
The message emerging from these decisions was clear: state action im-
munity for the government is a prerequisite to petitioning immunity
for the private parties; to the extent the former is restricted, the latter
is similarly curtailed.
In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation,2 3 2 a case decided the
same year as Pinehurst Airlines, continued the line of cases expres-
sing this view-that Voerr-Pennington immunity should not be avail-
able to petitioning parties where the government's conduct is not
immunized under Parker. In the initial district court opinion,2 3 3 the
private defendants (Hertz, Avis, National, and an Avis licensee)
sought summary judgment, claiming Noerr-Pennington immunity.
The court rested its denial of petitioning immunity on the commercial
exception and, after an extensive analysis of the first amendment pro-
tection of commercial speech, concluded:
Although [the Sherman Act) must yield to the First Amendment rights of
speech and petition when the government is acting in a policymaking capacity,
the Court concludes that when commercial speech is involved-when defend-
ants are seeking to influence the purely commercial functions of govern-
ment-the governmental interest in maintaining the integrity of the antitrust
laws must take precedence.
2 3 4
Despite this apparently sufficient basis for denying Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity, the court advanced another (perhaps the primary)
rationale for its decision: "[T]his Court's decision to retain Noerr-Pen-
nington's commercial/governmental distinction is prompted not only
by its First Amendment analysis but also by its desire for consistent
231. Id. at n.24 (emphasis added).
232. 474 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In Airport Car Rental, the plaintiffs sued com-
petitors, alleging a conspiracy to monopolize the airport car rental market involv-
ing several car rental companies and city airport authorities.
233. The Airport Car Rental litigation involved several actions commenced in various
district courts alleging that Hertz, National, and Avis engaged in joint activities to
influence airport authorities to exclude competing companies in violation of §§ 1
& 2 of the Sherman Act. Motions for summary judgment had been filed (in the
former district court case discussed previously) while the litigation was assigned
to the initial district court judge. This judge had ruled that the defendants were
not immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Following reassignment of
these cases to a different court, the defendants renewed their motions, albeit di-
rected at a different plaintiff and with respect to different airports.
234. Id. at 1086. In the next paragraph, the court clarified the scope of this eception
by noting that "when the government is acting in a purely commercial capacity,
as, for example, a buyer or seller of goods, the antitrust laws should be applied
.... Id. (emphasis added).
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application of the laws."235 The Airport Car Rental court plainly
feared that the private parties who instigated anticompetitive com-
mercial conduct by a city could otherwise escape liability while the
city itself could be held liable.236 The proper solution, according to the
court, would be to view the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines as
essentially co-extensive, i.e., Noerr-Pennington immunity should be
applied only to private attempts to influence government action that is
not itself subject to the antitrust laws.237 The court elaborated on this
"practical interrelation" rationale for making the Noerr-Pennington
immunity depend on the existence of a Parker immunity for the
government:
While it is true that Noerr-Pennington and Parker v. Brown are legal doc-
trines rooted in very separate principles-the right to petition versus sover-
eign immunity and federalism-the Court feels constrained to consider their
practical interrelation in order to avoid potentially inequitable or anomalous
results. And it certainly seems inequitable to hold a municipal official liable
for actions he took at the urging of a private party while ruling that the pri-
vate party is immune solely because it acted through the agency of that munic-
ipal official.
2 3 8
Thus, the rather conventional holding (commercial exception bars No-
err-Pennington immunity for private petitioners) was overshadowed
by dicta describing a broad principle under which the availability of
petitioning immunity is conditioned upon the presence of Parker im-
munity for the government's conduct.239
A subsequent district court opinion in the Airport Car Rental
case 240 soundly criticized the earlier decision. It rejected the notion
that Noerr-Pennington immunity for private parties necessarily de-
pends on the availability of state action immunity for the government:
There is, moreover, no necessary or logical relationship between the impo-
sition of liability on those who advocate anticompetitive activities and on those
who participate in them .... [The Sherman Act prohibits participation in,
not advocacy of, anticompetitive activities. Private parties attempting to influ-
ence public officials to engage in commercial activities which may later be
found to violate the antitrust laws do not thereby become themselves liable.
For liability to be imposed upon them, they must be participants in the
235. Id. at 1087-88 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 1088.
237. The court specifically noted: "[I]t seems appropriate to restrict the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine to attempts to influence government officials who are engaged
in activity that would be protected from the reach of the antitrust laws." Id. at
1090.
238. Id. at 1089-90 (emphasis added).
239. Id. at 1091. Ironically, the court cited the Lafayette decision for the principle that
Noerr-Pennington should, whenever possible, be applied in a manner consistent
with Parker- "ITihe courts should be reluctant to extend immunity to private
parties who have sought to influence government activity that would not be pro-
tected under the state action doctrine." Id.





The court in this second Airport Car Rental decision was persuaded
to reject not only the commercial exception to Noerr-Pennington but
also the proposition that petitioning immunity for private parties is
conditioned upon state action immunity for the government. The pri-
mary basis for rejecting this latter proposition was the inevitability of
"grave practical problems which would be encountered in its adminis-
tration."242 In effect, the court feared that uncertainty in predicting
whether the government's conduct would be immunized under Parker
would result in an unacceptable chilling of the private petitioner's
first amendment right to attempt to influence the government.24 3
The second opinion in Airport Car Rental was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit in 1982.244 The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the use
of a commercial exception to deny Noerr-Pennington immunity,245
and refused to require symmetry in the application of the Noerr-Pen-
nington and Parker doctrines.246 Since these decisions in the Airport
Car Rental cases, the express conditioning of Noerr-Pennington im-
munity on Parker immunity appears to have been avoided entirely by
the courts. However, the final sections of this Article will describe a
means of applying these two doctrines in a way that would achieve the
241. Id. at 584. The court found that denying petitioning immunity in the absence of
state action immunity is not compelled by the converse proposition (stated in
Wiggins and Metro Cable) that the petitioning is immune when it seeks govern-
ment action that is immune under Parker. The court observed: "The logic which
dictates that joint attempts to influence exempt activities should be immune does
not help answer the question whether liability should be imposed on joint action
to influence [government] activities which may not be exempt." Id. (emphasis
added).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 585. The court noted that this uncertainty would be aggravated in a suit in
which only the private parties were defendants. In such circumstances, the law-
fulness of the absent government officials cannot be fully litigated, and the liabil-
ity of the private parties may turn on the hypothetical liability of the absent
government officials. The risk inherent in such proceedings is that liability may
be founded on little more than speculation. Id.
244. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
245. The court asserted a broad first amendment protection for petitioning conduct:
"It is undisputed that the first amendment protects efforts to influence officials
making essentially commercial decisions on behalf of a governmental entity." Id.
at 87.
246. The court emphasized the separate legal roots of each doctrine in concluding that
petitioning immunity for private parties need not be conditioned on state action
immunity for the government:
When private parties persuade state officials to effectuate some an-
ticompetitive policy, an antitrust plaintiff might name both the private
parties and the State as defendants and thus implicate both Noerr-Pen-
nington and Parker. Because their liability is governed by "two separate
doctrines,".. . one defendant might be liable and the other exempt....




same result, i.e., denying petitioning immunity to the private petition-
ers when the government's conduct is not protected under Parker.
C. The Relationship Between Petitioning Immunity and State Action
Immunity: Detecting Subtle Linkage
To understand a court's application of the Noerr-Pennington and
Parker doctrines it is necessary to recall the Supreme Court's observa-
tion in Noerr that "where a restraint upon trade. . . is the result of
valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of
the [Sherman] Act can be made out."247 The clear intent of the Court
was to distinguish the conduct of a sovereign governmental entity
from the conduct of private parties; only the former is protected under
Parker. Most of the confusion among the lower courts in linking these
two immunity doctrines can be traced to a misinterpretation of the
phrase "valid governmental action," particularly the word "valid."
Courts are simply wrong in concluding that governmental conduct not
protected under Parker state action immunity automatically and nec-
essarily becomes invalid in the sense of no longer being governmental
in character.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,248 is a good
illustration of this important distinction. Under Colorado's home rule
authorization there was no question that the City of Boulder was au-
thorized to engage in cable franchising. Therefore, the city was in-
volved in valid governmental activity, despite the holding that such
broad authorization was insufficient to establish state action immunity
under Parker. Boulder did not hold that anticompetitive conduct un-
protected by Parker becomes invalid in the sense of being nongovern-
mental. Instead, Boulder held that such conduct may create antitrust
liability despite the fact that the conduct is governmental.
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,249 the court engaged
in an extensive examination of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the
application of the co-conspirator exception to Noerr-Pennington im-
munity.2 50 The Parker doctrine was discussed briefly, only to show
247. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961) (emphasis added).
248. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
249. 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983), vacated, 714
F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984). In Affiliated Capital,
an unsuccessful applicant for a cable television franchise sued the successful ap-
plicants, the City of Houston, and the Mayor of Houston, alleging a conspiracy to
bar its entry into Houston's cable television market in violation of § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
250. The district court granted judgment n.o.v. in favor of defendants, holding that the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff could not be sustained because there was
insufficient evidence that the alleged conspiracy was the cause of plaintiff's fail-
ure to receive a cable television franchise. Id. at 1012. Nonetheless, the court
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the interdependence with Noerr-Pennington. A careful review of this
decision illustrates the unsettled, complex, and misunderstood nature
of the relationship between these two immunity doctrines.
The court in Affiliated Capital first considered the application of
Noerr-Pennington immunity and concluded that "the validity of the
public official co-conspirator exception is well supported in the case
law."251 The court then attempted to distinguish the holding in Metro
Cable252 by concluding that the mayor and certain public officials in
Affiliated Capital "not only were involved actively in the conspiracy
to exclude non-conspirators but also directed certain of the activities
of co-conspirators."253 In fact, the conduct of the public officials in
Affiliated Capital (primarily encouraging various cable television
franchise applicants to work out a division of territory), although
characterized by the court as "vigorous involvement in orchestrating
certain aspects of the conspiracy,"254 could just as fairly be described
as "mere acquiescence in private conspirators' plans or mere support
of private parties' efforts to induce favorable legislative results."255
Courts have considerable latitude in judging whether particular
governmental conduct constitutes an "unlawful conspiracy." 256 This
judgment is further complicated by the need to distinquish an unlaw-
ful conspiracy from a lawful response to a petitioner's request. Under
Parker/Lafayette, the distinction rests on whether an anticompetitive
agreement was contemplated under a state authorizing statute.257
The court in Affiliated Capital next considered the applicability of
the Parker state action exemption to the facts of record. The court
held that Parker immunity was not available to the City of Houston or
the Mayor of Houston.258 The court's reasoning, however, reveals that
ventured an analysis of the Noerr-Pennington and Parker doctrines to demon-
strate that neither immunity doctrine was applicable to protect the defendants,
even if the plaintiff had prevailed on the causation issue. Although this analysis
is dictum with regard to the lower court opinion, the Fifth Circuit expressly ap-
proved the lower court's analysis of Parker, Noerr-Pennington, and the co-con-
spirator exception. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555,
1566-67 (5th Cir. 1984).
251. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991,1013 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
The court concluded that application of the co-conspirator exception was justified
on the facts in the record and declined to analyze the application of the sham
exception to these facts. Id.
252. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). See
supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (no conspiracy where government offi-
cials merely agreed to support the efforts of the private conspirators).
253. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981)
(emphasis added).
254. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
258. The court in Affiliated Capital concluded that "the Mayor and the City itself...
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its judgment regarding the liability of both public and private defend-
ants rested on a blurred view of petitioning and state action immuni-
ties. In effect, the court concluded that the public officials'
involvement in an illegal conspiracy barred both state action and peti-
tioning immunities:
This Court interprets the decisions rendered pursuant to the authority of
Noerr, Pennington and Parker as suggesting the following result. When a re-
straint of trade is the result of valid governmental action which was induced
by the joint efforts of private parties, those joint efforts are shielded by Noerr-
Pennington immunity. When, however, the governmental action is rendered
invalid by the illegal, not merely unethical, conduct of the governmental en-
tity acting as a co-conspirator, the joint efforts of the private parties are not
automatically entitled to immunity.2 5 9
This language appears to mean that there is but one co-conspirator
exception that applies simultaneously to bar both Parker immunity
for the governmental entity and Noerr-Pennington immunity for the
private petitioners. To the extent such a view considers these two doc-
trines to be equivalent, it is erroneous and no better than the view that
blindly conditions petitioning immunity for private parties on the
presence of state action immunity for the governmental body.260
Given the different sources and purposes of the two immunity doc-
trines, whether to apply a co-conspirator exception and what stan-
dards to use for such application are questions that should be
answered separately for each doctrine. In Affiliated Capital, the dis-
trict court concluded that the legislative action was rendered invalid
not only supported the lobbying efforts of [defendant] Gulf Coast and communi-
cated with applicants about franchise terms ... but also manipulated certain as-
pects of the conspiracy." Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp.
991, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1981). However, the court failed to discuss the scope of the
city's authority under state law to engage in franchising discussions with appli-
cants, an essential determination in gauging the lawfulness of the city's conduct
under Parker.
259. Id. at 1024-25 (emphasis added). The Court described specifically the circum-
stances in which such governmental conduct would be rendered invalid:
Where municipalities, or their agents acting in official capacities, are
proven, along with private parties, to have engaged in a conspiracy in
restraint of trade, the result is that the [governmental] actions which the
private parties sought to induce were unlawful and therefore rendered
at best invalid if not non-governmental.
Id. This reasoning is clearly at odds with the Parker line of cases, which makes
clear that private-public agreements in restraint of trade are lawful if adequately
authorized by the state and that the governmental conduct retains its governmen-
tal nature even if found to be unlawful under the antitrust laws. See supra note
248 and accompanying text.
260. The impropriety of conditioning Noerr-Pennington immunity on the availability
of Parker immunity rests largely on the fact that petitioning immunity has con-
stitutional roots while state action immunity is based on statutory construction
and principles of federalism and state sovereignty. It would be anomalous to con-
clude that a constitutional value such as the right to petition could be modified or
eliminated to conform to changes in the interpretation of the Sherman Act.
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by "the participation of the public officials in the illegal conspir-
acy."26 1 The Court correctly observed that the City's ultimate legisla-
tive power to act "was not rendered non-governmental by the
[conspiratorial] actions of the defendants,"262 but the court neglected
to follow up on this important distinction between invalid and non-
governmental as a starting point for a proper Parker analysis.
The denial of immunity to the private petitioners was asserted by
the Affiliated Capital court in a similar conclusory fashion.263 The
court's discussion regarding the application of a co-conspirator excep-
tion to Noerr-Penningtion immunity is unconvincing.26 4 The focus of
Noerr-Pennington immunity analysis should be on the governmental
versus non-governmental nature of the anticompetitive action sought,
and the application of an exception to this immunity should not be
based on a conclusory declaration that the governmental action was
"invalid" or "illegal."
26 5
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment n.o.v. for
the defendant, holding that sufficient evidence had been presented to
establish that the alleged conspiracy caused the denial of a franchise to
the plaintiff.2 6 6 However, the Fifth Circuit explicitly upheld the appli-
cation of the co-conspirator exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity
for the private parties.267 As a result, the original jury verdict award-
ing damages of $2.1 million was reinstated. Because the governmental
defendants had been dismissed or were otherwise immune from liabil-
ity, the effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision was to hold the private
petitioning party solely liable for damages arising from the violation of
the antitrust laws.
The Fifth Circuit's holding is of particular interest when compared
with the district court's analysis of the immunity doctrines. These two
cases, viewed together, demonstrate that there are two techniques
261. Affiliated Capital v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1025 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (em-
phasis added). The determination of whether an agreement involving the city is
"illegal" (i.e. a co-conspirator exception to Parker) requires a thorough analysis
according to the standards developed in Parker and its progeny. The court in
Affiliated Capital failed to recognize and apply such Parker standards; instead,
the court proclaimed the illegality of the legislative action (the co-conspirator ex-
ception) as a conclusion without any supportive reasoning.
262. Id. However, the effect of the court's reasoning was to conclude that the City's
legislative action, as tainted by the conspiracy, was rendered non-governmental.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
265. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1025 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
266. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1566 (5th Cir. 1984).
267. Id. at 1567. The City of Houston was not a party to the appeal, having been volun-
tarily dismissed by the plaintiff. Id. at 1557. The mayor was held to be entitled to
qualified immunity and, therefore, absolved of liability. Id. at 1570. Because no
issue remained regarding the liability of the governmental entity, the Fifth Cir-
cuit was able to avoid reviewing the district court's analytical morass regarding
the interdependence of the Parker and Noerr-Pennington immunities.
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equally effective in keeping a private petitioning party in the litigation
and subject to antitrust liability: (1) condition the availability of No-
err-Pennington immunity on the availability of Parker immunity so
that immunity for the private petitioner is barred upon a finding that
the government's conduct was "invalid"; or (2) liberally apply the co-
conspirator or other exception to deny immunity for the private peti-
tioning party. The potential for abuse in using these techniques is es-
pecially important in the wake of the Local Government Antitrust Act
of 1984.268
D. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984: New Pressure on
Noerr-Pennington Petitioning Immunity
Effective September 24, 1984, the recovery of monetary damages
from any local government (or from its officials "acting in an official
capacity") is prohibited.269 In effect, at least with respect to monetary
damages, municipalities are entitled to a Parker-type immunity from
antitrust liability for anticompetitive actions. 27 0 Although cities are
absolutely immune from antitrust damage judgments, the Act does
not immunize cities from actions for injunctive relief. Therefore, the
traditional Parker state action immunity analysis will continue to ap-
ply to muncipalities seeking to avoid injunctive suits under the anti-
trust laws.
271
A probable effect of this "damage immunity" for cities will be to
place an increased emphasis on recovery of damages from private
party defendants. Whenever a private-governmental conspiracy is al-
leged to have caused financial loss, the plaintiff's sole source of dam-
age recovery will be the remaining private defendants. Therefore, a
court that seeks to avoid a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery may
resort to techniques that will keep private parties in the litigation.
268. 1984 Act, supra note 20, at § 3(a).
269. Section 3(b) establishes a general bar against application of the Act to cases com-
menced before the effective date. However, the Act grants the courts discretion
to apply subsection (a) of § 3 when "it would be inequitable not to apply this
subsection to a pending case." Id. at § 3(b). Proceedings that have reached a jury
verdict, district court judgment, or a subsequent stage of litigation as of the effec-
tive date are presumed ineligible for the damage immunity. Id.
270. A detailed analysis of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 is beyond the
scope of this Article. The Act appears to grant unqualified protection from mone-
tary damages being assessed against any city, without respect to the "official" or
"valid" nature of the conduct. In other words, the Act not only removes the re-
quirement imposed by the Supreme Court in Boulder that there be a specific and
affirmative grant of authority from the state to the city but, further, removes any
requirement that a city's conduct be within any limits of state authorization. The
monetary damages immunity for cities under the Act is broad and absolute.
271. While cities' financial exposure to damages has been eliminated, the availability
of injunctive relief results in financial burdens to cities required to defend actions
that will undoubtedly be creatively pleaded as injunctive suits.
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The effect may be a new wave of restrictions on the scope of Noerr-
Pennington petitioning immunity.
A court may conclude (erroneously) that the availability of peti-
tioning immunity for the private parties is dependent on Parker im-
munity for the city. Because of the considerable discretion available
to courts in applying the Parker doctrine,272 in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances a court may be able to justify its conclusion that Parker
immunity should not apply to the city's conduct. Consequently Noerr-
Pennington immunity would be denied to the private parties, even in
cases where petitioning immunity for the private parties should be
available under a conventional Noerr-Pennington analysis.273
Similar results (denying petitioning immunity) can be achieved by
applying liberally the "sham," "co-conspirator," or other exceptions to
Noerr-Pennington immunity. Especially now that recovery of mone-
tary damages from a city is barred by federal statute, plaintiffs seeking
damages for antitrust injuries will be motivated to allege that the pri-
vate petitioners' conduct justifies application of an exception to deny
Noerr-Pennington immunity. To preserve a plaintiff's damages rem-
edy, courts may become increasingly sympathetic to using exceptions
to bar immunity for private petitioners, in pleadings and throughout
the course of litigation. As discussed in Section III, the application of
exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity involves considerable lati-
tude by the courts.274 Such exceptions are capable of being broadly
applied to ensure that antitrust plaintiffs are not barred from mone-
tary damage relief. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Affiliated Capi-
tal275 represents just such a liberal application of the co-conspirator
exception. The local government defendants had been dismissed or
were immunized from damage liability.276 The almost inescapable
conclusion is that denying petitioning immunity to the private defend-
ant was necessary to avoid a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery of
monetary damages.
272. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
273. A particularly ironic result of conditioning Noerr-Pennington immunity on the
availability of Parker immunity is that petitioning immunity would be preserved
primarily in those cases in which local government has the least amount of policy
making discretion. Based on the Parker analysis developed through Lafayette
and Boulder, a city whose conduct is rooted in broad policy authority risks losing
its state action protection, whereas a city whose action has been directed, author-
ized, or at least contemplated by the state is most likely to be immunized under
Parker. Thus, petitioning immunity would be most assured in those cases in
which it is least needed-where the significant policy determinations have al-
ready been made.
274. See supra notes 142-201 and accompanying text.
275. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984). See
supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.




Section 4(a) of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 pro-
vides that no damages may be recovered "in any [antitrust] claim
against a person based on any official action directed by a local gov-
ernment."277 Therefore, it might be argued that this Act protects pri-
vate parties against narrow application of Noerr-Pennington
immunity by protecting private parties whose actions are arguably "di-
rected by local government." However, the legislative history of this
statute makes it clear that courts will not be required to grant immu-
nity to all private parties petitioning for or otherwise involved in an-
ticompetitive governmental conduct. The Conference Report
specifically states:
In referring in section 4 to the application of the antitrust laws to the con-
duct of non-governmental parties directed by a local government, the confer-
ees borrowed the phrase "official action directed by" a local government from
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); and the conferees intend that
Parker and subsequent cases interpreting it shall apply by analogy to the con-
duct of a local government in directing the actions of non-governmental par-
ties, as if the local government were a state.
2 78
Unfortunately, such a test lacks certainty due to the considerable
discretion available to courts in applying the Parker doctrine. Thus,
the test is capable of being applied restrictively to deny immunity to
private parties.279 This analogous application of the Parker standard
to private conduct contributes to the confusion which inevitably arises
when the characteristics, purposes, and applications of Parker and No-
err-Pennington doctrines are blurred by failure to treat each
separately.280
Even if courts are able to avoid the difficulties in applying a Parker
analysis to the conduct of private parties, such a standard will not pro-
tect them where the court concludes that liability of the private party
is necessary for the plaintiff to collect any damages. The formulation
of the test in the Conference Report simply does not prevent courts
from using the Parker line of cases to keep the private party in the
litigation.28 '
277. 1984 Act, supra note 20, at § 4(a).
278. Conference Report on Local Government Antitrust Act, H.R. REP. NO. 1158, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 47 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 737 (1984). The
House Judiciary Committee had intended that H.R. 6027 would not immunize
private parties involved in typical arrangements with local government: "[T]he
term [agent] would generally not include persons that operate a business for
profit to market a service or product under a license or franchise agreement with
a local government-such persons would receive protection only if their conduct
is 'expressly required' by a local government." H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 10A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4622 (1984).
279. For a discussion of the restrictive application of the Parker doctrine see notes 83
& 86-87 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 208-46 and accompanying text.
281. For example, a court need only conclude that the anticompetitive actions of the
private party were not directly authorized by the city or were not even contem-
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The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, while relieving cities
of antitrust damage liability, contains only a shadow of similar protec-
tion for private parties. Plaintiffs and courts might be increasingly
motivated to collect monetary damages from private party defendants.
Neither the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine, if applied restric-
tively, nor the "Parker-by-analogy" immunity doctrine will provide
private parties sufficient protection. Both approaches are capable of
being manipulated to keep the private party in the litigation.
E. A Recommended Approach to the Application of the Noerr-Pennington
and Parker Doctrines
Given the important role of municipalities in the regulation and
delivery of goods and services, there is a need for a clearer articulation
of standards that will apply to anticompetitive municipal conduct re-
quested by private parties. While federal legislation has eliminated
cities' exposure to financial liability for damages, the Parker doctrine
will continue to define the contours of state action immunity in suits
for injunctive relief.28 2 Of greater importance is the need to define the
scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity for private parties who seek to
persuade the municipality to initiate the challenged anticompetitive
conduct. The final section of this Article describes a recommended
approach for the application of the Parker state action immunity doc-
trine and the Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity doctrine. An
understanding of the proper relationship between these two doctrines
is both a premise for and a result of such an approach.
Under the Parker doctrine, the essential focus is on whether the
local government's conduct was authorized by the state. The specific
conduct must at least have been "contemplated" by the state.283 This
standard arises from the principles of federalism in which the sover-
eignty of cities is not recognized; only state and federal governments
fit within this dual system of government.28 4
In general, Parker immunity should be applied broadly and the
requisite state authorization should be inferred generously to avoid
undue interference on antitrust grounds with local government's ex-
piated by the city. This test is capable of yielding opposite results on virtually
identical facts. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Additionally, there
is no consistency among the courts with regard to the recognition or application
of various exceptions to the Parker immunity doctrine. Thus, various exceptions
can be used by courts to deny immunity to private parties under the "Parker-by-
analogy" methodology announced in the Act.
282. In addition, the Parker doctrine will be used to determine the damage immunity
of private parties whose conduct is "official action directed by a local govern-
ment" under § 4 of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. See supra notes
277-81 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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tensive responsibilities in providing and regulating goods and services.
A lack of such authorization should be found only where expressly
provided for in "non-authorizing" state statutes or where the local
government's conduct is clearly beyond any reasonable or conven-
tional activity reasonably contemplated by the state legislature.
The use of the conspiracy exception to deny Parker immunity
should be limited to instances where the government's conduct is
shown to be devoid of any governmental purpose and motivated solely
by private interests. Any other approach would require the impossible
(that local government officials be free of any personal bias or interest
in a decision), or the impractical (that local government officials' dom-
inant interest in the decision be governmental rather than personal).
This approach, favoring broad Parker immunity, will also serve to pro-
tect private parties under the "Parker-by-analogy" standard an-
nounced in section 4 of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine of immunity for private parties
who petition for anticompetitive governmental conduct has roots in
constitutional principles and involves the need to preserve the free
flow of ideas from the people to their representatives. Particularly in
a legislative context, the right of private petitioners to obtain access to
local government must not be abridged lightly, and even unethical
techniques used to influence public officials must be within Noerr-
Pennington's broad protection. Only clearly unlawful conduct (such
as bribery) should be grounds for denying legislative petitioning im-
munity under antitrust laws. In an adjudicative setting it is proper to
apply a stricter standard in order to preserve the integrity of judicial
and agency tribunals. For example, submitting false information to
such tribunals may be grounds for denying Noerr-Pennington
immunity.
The most important Noerr-Pennington issues involve the applica-
tion of the three primary exceptions to this immunity doctrine: the
"co-conspiracy" exception,285 the "commercial" exception,28 6 and the
"sham" exception.28 7 Of these exceptions, the co-conspiracy exception
tends to generate the most confusion in the relationship between the
Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines.288 The co-conspiracy excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington should be applied to legislative petitioning
only in limited situations. Mere economic or political interest by gov-
ernment officials in the results of decisionmaking should not, without
285. See supra notes 149-69 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
288. Indeed, for courts which hold the view that petitioning immunity should be con-
ditioned on the availability of state action immunity, the application of a co-con-
spiracy exception to Parker constitutes a simultaneous and automatic denial of




more, constitute grounds for denying Noerr-Pennington immunity.
This broad protection of legislative petitioning is essential to avoid
chilling the right to petition and to preserve communication of ideas
within a representative democracy.
The use of a commercial/governmental distinction should be aban-
doned. Although theoretically plausible, the proper application of
such an exception is virtually impossible. Defining a "commercial" ac-
tivity in an age of broad local government involvement in a wide array
of economic activities is a task certain to lead to inconsistent results in
the courts. Further, the proprietary nature of particular governmen-
tal conduct does not necessarily mean that the conduct lacks policy-
making characteristics. Indeed, it is the policy/political nature of the
activity rather than any economic indicia that properly triggers Noerr-
Pennington immunity.
The "sham" exception, although generally applied only in adminis-
trative or judicial contexts, can be used to deny legislative petitioning
immunity. However, this exception should be applied narrowly to
protect all petitioning where the private party's intent was to influ-
ence the governmental body. The recent willingness of courts to find
that a single proceeding could constitute a "sham" is an unnecessary
erosion of Noerr-Pennington immunity and inevitably chills the will-
ingness of private parties to petition the government.28 9 Preservation
of constitutional values suggests that a presumption in favor of finding
proper petitioning intent should operate to bar the sham exception in
all but entirely baseless proceedings.
The Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine should broadly protect
the petitioning conduct of private parties. Although such broad appli-
cation of the doctrine will insulate private anticompetitive conduct
from the reach of the antitrust laws, this approach is necessary if pri-
vate input into the local government decisionmaking process is to be
preserved.
Finally, the constitutional protection of Noerr-Pennington should
not be eroded by misguided attempts to condition Noerr-Pennington
immunity for the local government. The separate purposes and roots
of these two doctrines mandate separate analysis under each doctrine.
Likewise, the use of liberal pleading standards should not be permit-
ted to deny private petitioning immunity based on weak allegations of
conduct claimed to justify application of one of the exceptions to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 is likely to place in-
creased pressure on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as plaintiffs and
289. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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courts look for defendants against whom damage judgments can be
awarded. A watchful guard is needed to preserve the doctrine in such
changed circumstances. Important constitutional interests such as the
right to petition, the right of access to government proceedings, and
the flow of communication to government representatives should not
be blindly sacrificed merely to enhance a plaintiff's recovery under a
scheme of antitrust statutes. Preservation of a maximally competitive
economic order must be secondary to preserving basic constitutional
values that underlie the nation's democracy.
Keith E. Moxon, '85
